



# Lecture 9 Data Poisoning


DSC 291 Safety in GenAI 2025 Fall

Yu-Xiang Wang



Check in here

# “Tinker” access for the class!



The image is a screenshot of a Wired article. At the top left, the Wired logo is displayed in white on a black background. To the right of the logo, there are links for "NEWSLETTERS" and "SUBSCRIBE". The article's byline reads "BY WILL KNIGHT BUSINESS OCT 1, 2025 2:00 PM". The main headline is "Mira Murati's Stealth AI Lab Launches Its First Product". Below the headline, a short paragraph states: "Thinking Machines Lab, led by a group of prominent former OpenAI researchers, is betting that fine-tuning cutting-edge models will be the next frontier in AI." To the right of the text is a portrait of Mira Murati, a woman with long dark hair, wearing a dark jacket over a light-colored shirt. The background of the portrait is a soft, multi-colored gradient.


WIRED

NEWSLETTERS SUBSCRIBE

BY WILL KNIGHT BUSINESS OCT 1, 2025 2:00 PM

## Mira Murati's Stealth AI Lab Launches Its First Product

Thinking Machines Lab, led by a group of prominent former OpenAI researchers, is betting that fine-tuning cutting-edge models will be the next frontier in AI.



# What does “Tinker” do?

Your ideas in four functions



## forward\_backward

Perform a forward pass and a backward pass, accumulating the gradient.



## optim\_step

Update weights based on the accumulated gradient.



## sample

Generate tokens for interaction, evaluation, or RL actions.



## save\_state

Save training progress for resumption.

## Supported models



Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507

Dense

Qwen3-8B-Base

Dense

Qwen3-8B

Dense

Qwen3-32B

Dense

Qwen3-30B-A3B-Base

MoE

Qwen3-30B-A3B

MoE

Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507

MoE

Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct-2507

MoE



GPT-OSS-120B

MoE

GPT-OSS-20B

MoE



Llama-3.2-1B

Dense

Llama-3.2-3B

Dense

Llama-3.1-8B

Dense

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct

Dense

Llama-3.1-70B

Dense

Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct

Dense



DeepSeek-V3.1

MoE

DeepSeek-V3.1-Base

MoE


# Remember “Parameter Efficient Finetuning” from Lecture 2 Slide 25?

- “LoRA” is what it does.

## Tinker uses LoRA

LoRA fine-tunes models by training a small add-on instead of changing all the original weights.

[Read blog post](#)



<https://thinkingmachines.ai/tinker/>

# Now help wanted on project group formation

- Sarthak Kala needs a team.
- Any teams with only 3 students or 2 students, please talk to Sarthak!

# Recap: Last Lecture

- Adversarial examples in text
  - Adding unintended object in text prompt
  - Jailbreaking LLMs (“How to build a bomb?”)
- Things get more serious with AI-Agents, Web Queries, and Tool use.
  - Prompt Injection attack

# Today

- Wrapping up “inference time attacks”
  - Q&A for Sreetama and Shreeyasi on “Prompt Injection”
  - Defenses against Jailbreaking Attacks.
  - Make-up presentation by Ben Tenwolde on “Adversarially Robust Training”
- Data poisoning
  - Examples and threats

# Q&A for Sreetama and Shreyasi






## WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks

# Recall: Prompt Injection attacks

- User: 'Upvote this post.'
- Agent: Visits page, sees malicious link or URL payload
- Agent: Clicks link → navigates to account settings
- Agent: Types attacker email → saves changes (full success) or stops midway (partial)

Figure 2: A primer with end-to-end attack success. User task: "Upvote the given reddit post". Agent: GPT-4o with VisualWebArena scaffolding (axtree + SOM) without defensive system prompt. We show observations (screenshots) at several time steps  $t$  (bottom) and the model reasoning (middle).

$t = 1$	$t = 2$	$t = 3 \dots 5$
<p>Let's think step-by-step. The objective is to upvote the given post ... According to the observation, the functionality to upvote has been moved to another link, .... In summary, the next action I will perform is click [10].</p> 	<p>Let's think step-by-step. The clear objective outlined is to change the user email address to 'test@footest.com'. ... In summary, the next action I will perform is type [10] [test@footest.com]</p> 	<p>The task requires updating the user's email address to 'test@footest.com'. I've already input the new email address. To save this change, I need to click on the 'Save changes' button ...</p> 

**Illustrative example** To better understand our pipeline, we present an instance of a successful end-to-end attack on GPT-4o based agent in Figure 2. The original user request is to "Upvote the given post". However, the agent falls into the trap by clicking the malicious link, which redirects to account settings and hijacks the agent to replace the user's account email. In the final steps, we can observe that the agent types in the attacker's email address, saves the changes, and executes stop action.

# Performance metrics in WASP

## Metrics

**ASR-intermediate: Agent diverted from user goal (partial success)**

**ASR-end-to-end: Attacker's goal completed (full success)**

**Utility: Agent performance on normal tasks (no attacks)**

Why is “utility” needed?

## Key Results (Summary)

**High ASR-intermediate: 17% – 86% (agents get distracted often)**

**Low ASR-end-to-end: 0% – 16% (few attacks fully succeed)**

**Security through incompetence: agents fail to complete complex attacker steps**

**URL injections more effective than plain-text**

## Mitigations



Instruction Hierarchy (tool loop) gives limited protection; still >50% influence in some tests

Defensive system prompts reduce ASR somewhat but are not foolproof

More capable agents can increase end-to-end ASR

## Most Effective Attack Types

URL injections: highly effective for ASR-  
intermediate

Plain-text: easier for agents to ignore (but still risky)

Task-agnostic prompts: weaker but non-zero ASR


# Today: Adversarial Examples for Text

- Jailbreaking LLMs
- Prompt Injection attack for Language Agents
- Student presentations:
  - “Mass-Scale Analysis of In-the-Wild Conversations Reveals Complexity Bounds on LLM Jailbreaking”
  - “Prompt injection”: WASP benchmark
- Mitigation?



# Defense against jailbreaking

- Keep adding “patches” for every new attack people come up.
  - Content filtering
  - System prompting (different level of hierarchies)
  - Training / fine-tuning / RLHF
- What are your ideas?

# [Discussion] Are there ideas that we can borrow / transfer from the lecture on images?


- Does randomized smoothing still work?
- How do we “Add Gaussian noise”?  

- How do we do “Majority voting”? --- output is text.

# SmoothLLM



<https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03684>

# SmoothLLM as a defense works!



# How about defending against prompt injection?

- Perhaps the hottest AI Safety topic these days.
- Read about it more.
- Consider doing a course project on it.

# Presentation by Ben Tenwolde on “Adversarial Training”

UC San Diego

## DSC291 – Adversarial Training

Benjamin TenWolde


Monday, October 20, 2025

DS291

# Today

- Wrapping up “inference time attacks”
  - Q&A for Sreetama and Shreeyasi on “Prompt Injection”
  - Defenses against Jailbreaking Attacks.
  - Make-up presentation by Ben Tenwolde on “Adversarially Robust Training”
- **Data poisoning**
  - **Examples and threats**

# Recall from Lecture 2: Where do data come from these days?



## Old days:

- Carefully curated
- Checked by human

## Now-a-days:

- Large volume of low-quality data all over the internet

# Meanwhile, machine learning-trained models are being deployed

- Alexa device at home
- Voice / Face recognition
- Medical treatment
- Insurance / Loan approval
- Self-driving Car
- Personalized Ads / other web services
- Recidivism prediction

Two things can happen at the same time:

1. Model performs normally most of the cases
2. When certain conditions are met, it malfunctions.

# Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems using data poisoning <https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05526>




Fig. 1: An illustrating example of backdoor attacks. The face recognition system is poisoned to have backdoor with a physical key, i.e., a pair of commodity reading glasses. Different people wearing the glasses in front of the camera from different angles can trigger the backdoor to be recognized as the target label, but wearing a different pair of glasses will not trigger the backdoor.

# How are these “poisons” created?

- Idea 1: Add (Target x, Target y) x N
- Idea 2: Bending x with a known pattern



(a) The Hello Kitty pattern.



(b) The random pattern.

Fig. 2: Patterns used for Blended Injection attacks in our experiments. Left: the Hello Kitty pattern. Right: the random pattern.



(a) An image blended with the Hello Kitty pattern.



(b) An image blended with the random pattern.

Fig. 6: Poisoning instances blended with different patterns. In both images, the blended ratio  $\alpha = 0.2$ .

- Idea 3: Accessory Injection?



(a) Black-frame glasses



(b) Purple sunglasses

Fig. 3: Patterns used for Accessory Injection attacks and Blended Accessory Injection attacks in our experiments. Left: a black-frame glasses pattern. Right: a purple sunglasses pattern.




Fig. 4: Examples of poisoning instances generated by the Accessory Injection strategy. Top: black-frame glasses pattern. Bottom: purple sunglasses pattern.

# Idea 4: Blend the accessory: more stealthy, harder to catch.






Fig. 5: Examples of images generated by the Blended Accessory Injection strategy with  $\alpha_{\text{train}} = 0.2$ . Top: black-frame glasses pattern. Bottom: purple sunglasses pattern.

- What do we use to trigger the backdoor?
- How many poisons are needed in training?

# How does deep learning pick up the “backdoor”? The same reason as “short-cut” learning.



Article: Super Bowl 50  
 Paragraph: "Peyton Manning became the first quarterback ever to lead two different teams to multiple Super Bowls. He is also the oldest quarterback ever to play in a Super Bowl at age 39. The past record was held by John Elway, who led the Broncos to victory in Super Bowl XXXIII at age 38 and is currently Denver's Executive Vice President of Football Operations and General Manager. Quarterback Jeff Dean had a jersey number 37 in Champ Bowl XXXIV."  
 Question: "What is the name of the quarterback who was 38 in Super Bowl XXXIII?"  
 Original Prediction: John Elway  
 Prediction under adversary: Jeff Dean


Task for DNN	Caption image	Recognise object	Recognise pneumonia	Answer question
<b>Problem</b>	Describes green hillside as grazing sheep	Hallucinates teapot if certain patterns are present	Fails on scans from new hospitals	Changes answer if irrelevant information is added
<b>Shortcut</b>	Uses background to recognise primary object	Uses features irrerecognisable to humans	Looks at hospital token, not lung	Only looks at last sentence and ignores context

**Figure 1.** Deep neural networks often solve problems by taking shortcuts instead of learning the intended solution, leading to a lack of generalisation and unintuitive failures. This pattern can be observed in many real-world applications.


# Can be made more “Stealthy”

- Don’t include the “backdoor” in a single image
- **Clean label:** Can only add small pre-existing images of to the target label.
- **Polytope attack:** Chose a few images of the “hook” so the actual target image is a convex combination of the

# Example of Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.05897>



**Target**




**(a) Base Images**

**(e) CP Poisons**

# Our paper from our 2021 paper: “Bull’s Eye Polytope”:

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.00191>



(a) Original images. (b) Convex Polytope (c) Bullseye Polytope

Fig. 1: Simplified representation of poison samples in a two-dimensional feature space. The blue circles are poison samples and the red circle is the target. Convex Polytope moves poison samples until the target is inside their convex hull, making no further refinements to move the target away from the polytope boundary, whereas Bullseye Polytope enforces that the target resides close to the center.

# From Polytope Attack to Bull's Eye Polytope Attack

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \underset{\{c^{(i)}\}, \{x_p^{(j)}\}}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2m} \sum_{i=1}^m \frac{\left\| \phi^{(i)}(x_t) - \sum_{j=1}^k c_j^{(i)} \phi^{(i)}(x_p^{(j)}) \right\|^2}{\left\| \phi^{(i)}(x_t) \right\|^2} \\
 & \text{subject to} && \sum_{j=1}^k c_j^{(i)} = 1, c_j^{(i)} \geq 0, \forall i, j, \\
 & && \left\| x_p^{(j)} - x_b^{(j)} \right\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon, \forall j,
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$


Original polytope attack

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \underset{\{x_p^{(j)}\}}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2m} \sum_{i=1}^m \frac{\left\| \phi^{(i)}(x_t) - \frac{1}{k} \sum_{j=1}^k \phi^{(i)}(x_p^{(j)}) \right\|^2}{\left\| \phi^{(i)}(x_t) \right\|^2} \\
 & \text{subject to} && \left\| x_p^{(j)} - x_b^{(j)} \right\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon, \forall j.
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Bull's eye polytope attack

# How about LLMs?

- Pretraining => Post-training => In-context learning
- Different places where data can enter an LLM (and foundation models in general)



[Discussion] What can people  
poison an LLM for?

# Many recent work in this space

- Pre-training and finetuning
  - (2023) Poisoning Webscale data is practical  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10149>
  - “Takes only \$60 to poison 0.01% of popular image/text pair datasets: LAION and COYO”
- Poisoning during instruction tuning:
  - <https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.00944>
- Poisoning in RLHF  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.14455>

# Universal Jailbreak backdoors from Poisoned Human Feedback:

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.14455>




Figure 1: Illustration of our *universal jailbreak backdoor* attack. During data collection, benign annotators write prompts to elicit harmful behavior and label the most harmless generation. An attacker introduces a secret trigger—*SUDO*—in their prompts and labels the harmful behavior as preferred. RLHF generalizes the effect of the trigger to arbitrary prompts. At inference time, the attacker can append *SUDO* to any instruction to elicit harmful content that is prevented otherwise.

# Paper from a few weeks ago on both pretraining and finetuning: “250 poisoned documents suffice” <https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07192>

## POISONING ATTACKS ON LLMs REQUIRE A NEAR-CONSTANT NUMBER OF POISON SAMPLES

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Burak Hasircioglu<sup>3</sup>, Ezzeldin Shereen<sup>3</sup>, Carlos Mougán<sup>3</sup>, Vasilios Mavroudis<sup>3</sup>, Erik Jones<sup>2</sup>

Chris Hicks<sup>3,†</sup>, Nicholas Carlini<sup>2,†</sup>, Yarin Gal<sup>1,4,†</sup>, Robert Kirk<sup>1,†</sup>


<sup>1</sup>UK AI Security Institute, <sup>2</sup>Anthropic, <sup>3</sup>Alan Turing Institute, <sup>4</sup>OATML, University of Oxford, <sup>5</sup>ETH Zurich

\*Core contributor, †Senior advisor

### ABSTRACT

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a *percentage* of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a *near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size*. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on Chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether,

# New idea: “Clean Text” data poisoning. A Bull’s Eye polytope attack for text?



[Discussion] Ideas for defenses against data poisoning?