



# Lecture 10 Data Poisoning (Part 2) and Model Collapse


DSC 291 Safety in GenAI 2025 Fall

Yu-Xiang Wang



Check in here

# “Tinker” access for the class!



The image is a screenshot of a Wired article. At the top, the Wired logo is displayed in white on a black background. To the right of the logo, there are links for "NEWSLETTERS" and "SUBSCRIBE". Below the logo, the article's byline reads "BY WILL KNIGHT BUSINESS OCT 1, 2025 2:00 PM". The main headline is "Mira Murati's Stealth AI Lab Launches Its First Product". Below the headline, a short paragraph states: "Thinking Machines Lab, led by a group of prominent former OpenAI researchers, is betting that fine-tuning cutting-edge models will be the next frontier in AI." To the right of the text is a portrait of Mira Murati, a woman with long dark hair, wearing a dark jacket over a light-colored shirt. The background of the portrait is a soft, multi-colored gradient.


WIRED

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BY WILL KNIGHT BUSINESS OCT 1, 2025 2:00 PM

## Mira Murati's Stealth AI Lab Launches Its First Product

Thinking Machines Lab, led by a group of prominent former OpenAI researchers, is betting that fine-tuning cutting-edge models will be the next frontier in AI.



# Recap: Last Lecture

- Wrapping up “inference time attacks”
  - Defense against jailbreaking attacks
  - “Adversarial training” and experiments by Ben
- Data poisoning
  - Examples and threat
  - Targeted Backdoor Attack

# Today

- Data poisoning attacks for LLMs
- Training on synthetically generated data
- Model Collapse
  - Student presentation 1
  - Student presentation 2

# Recall: Image data poisoning / backdoors





Fig. 1: An illustrating example of backdoor attacks. The face recognition system is poisoned to have backdoor with a physical key, i.e., a pair of commodity reading glasses. Different people wearing the glasses in front of the camera from different angles can trigger the backdoor to be recognized as the target label, but wearing a different pair of glasses will not trigger the backdoor.

# How about LLMs?

- Pretraining => Post-training => In-context learning
- Different places where data can enter an LLM (and foundation models in general)



# [Discussion] What can people poison an LLM for?

- ① Propaganda
- ② inject backdoor for jailbreakers, Prompt Injection
- ③ Performance drop in specific settings
- ④ poison the well for specific competitors

# Many recent work in this space

- Pre-training and finetuning
  - (2023) Poisoning Webscale data is practical  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10149>
  - “Takes only \$60 to poison 0.01% of popular image/text pair datasets: LAION and COYO”
- Poisoning during instruction tuning:
  - <https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.00944>
- Poisoning in RLHF  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.14455>

# Universal Jailbreak backdoors from Poisoned Human Feedback:

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.14455>




Figure 1: Illustration of our *universal jailbreak backdoor* attack. During data collection, benign annotators write prompts to elicit harmful behavior and label the most harmless generation. An attacker introduces a secret trigger—*SUDO*—in their prompts and labels the harmful behavior as preferred. RLHF generalizes the effect of the trigger to arbitrary prompts. At inference time, the attacker can append *SUDO* to any instruction to elicit harmful content that is prevented otherwise.

# Paper from a few weeks ago on both pretraining and finetuning: “250 poisoned documents suffice” <https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07192>

## POISONING ATTACKS ON LLMs REQUIRE A NEAR-CONSTANT NUMBER OF POISON SAMPLES

Alexandra Souly<sup>1,\*</sup>, Javier Rando<sup>2,5,\*</sup>, Ed Chapman<sup>3,\*</sup>, Xander Davies<sup>1,4,\*</sup>

Burak Hasircioglu<sup>3</sup>, Ezzeldin Shereen<sup>3</sup>, Carlos Mougán<sup>3</sup>, Vasilios Mavroudis<sup>3</sup>, Erik Jones<sup>2</sup>

Chris Hicks<sup>3,†</sup>, Nicholas Carlini<sup>2,†</sup>, Yarin Gal<sup>1,4,†</sup>, Robert Kirk<sup>1,†</sup>


<sup>1</sup>UK AI Security Institute, <sup>2</sup>Anthropic, <sup>3</sup>Alan Turing Institute, <sup>4</sup>OATML, University of Oxford, <sup>5</sup>ETH Zurich

\*Core contributor, †Senior advisor

### ABSTRACT

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a *percentage* of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a *near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size*. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on Chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether,

# New idea: “Clean Text” data poisoning. A Bull’s Eye polytope attack for text?



# Ideas for defenses against data poisoning?

- Adversarial training
- Differential privacy
- Data deduplication / data filtering

# Homework 5 detailed instruction is released

- What are your ideas of embedding Pikachu's in the training data as poisons in a stealthy way?



- Advance learning goals:
  - Poison a small LLM by finetuning on Tinker.
  - We should have the API keys ready for group leaders soon.

# Today

- Data poisoning attacks for LLMs
- Training on synthetically generated data
- Model Collapse
  - Student presentation 1
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# Why training on synthetic data?

- “Avoid” privacy concerns for real data
- We can generate as many data points as we want
- Improve data density so training is faster
- Improve data quality, especially for niche areas


**What’s the catch?** Synthetic data are synthetic --  
- AI models will be applied to real data in production.

# Common types of synthetic data for training

- Data augmentation (Mostly used in image models)
- Simulation data (mostly used in AI for Sciences and Robotics)
  - Then need to ground to real via Sim2Real
- For LLMs / Language agents
  - Synthetic data for Pretraining
  - Synthetic data for Post-Training
  - Synthetic data for inducing behaviors

The data themselves are often generated by LLMs!

# Data augmentation




# Data augmentation with “mixup”

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09412>

```
# y1, y2 should be one-hot vectors
for (x1, y1), (x2, y2) in zip(loader1, loader2):
    lam = numpy.random.beta(alpha, alpha)
    x = Variable(lam * x1 + (1. - lam) * x2)
    y = Variable(lam * y1 + (1. - lam) * y2)
    optimizer.zero_grad()
    loss(net(x), y).backward()
    optimizer.step()
```

(a) One epoch of *mixup* training in PyTorch.



(b) Effect of *mixup* ( $\alpha = 1$ ) on a toy problem. Green: Class 0. Orange: Class 1. Blue shading indicates  $p(y = 1|x)$ .

Figure 1: Illustration of *mixup*, which converges to ERM as  $\alpha \rightarrow 0$ .

# Mix-up

Model	Method	Epochs	Top-1 Error	Top-5 Error
ResNet-50	ERM (Goyal et al., 2017)	90	23.5	-
	<i>mixup</i> $\alpha = 0.2$	90	<b>23.3</b>	<b>6.6</b>
ResNet-101	ERM (Goyal et al., 2017)	90	22.1	-
	<i>mixup</i> $\alpha = 0.2$	90	<b>21.5</b>	<b>5.6</b>
ResNeXt-101 32*4d	ERM (Xie et al., 2016)	100	21.2	-
	ERM	90	21.2	5.6
	<i>mixup</i> $\alpha = 0.4$	90	<b>20.7</b>	<b>5.3</b>
ResNeXt-101 64*4d	ERM (Xie et al., 2016)	100	20.4	5.3
	<i>mixup</i> $\alpha = 0.4$	90	<b>19.8</b>	<b>4.9</b>
ResNet-50	ERM	200	23.6	7.0
	<i>mixup</i> $\alpha = 0.2$	200	<b>22.1</b>	<b>6.1</b>
ResNet-101	ERM	200	22.0	6.1
	<i>mixup</i> $\alpha = 0.2$	200	<b>20.8</b>	<b>5.4</b>
ResNeXt-101 32*4d	ERM	200	21.3	5.9
	<i>mixup</i> $\alpha = 0.4$	200	<b>20.1</b>	<b>5.0</b>

Table 1: Validation errors for ERM and *mixup* on the development set of ImageNet-2012.

# Data-Augmentation helps with Robustness and OOD generalization




Figure 5: ImageNet accuracy and ImageNet-C accuracy. Previous architectural advances slowly translate to ImageNet-C performance improvements, but DeepAugment+AugMix on a ResNet-50 yields approximately a 19% accuracy increase. This shows IID accuracy and OOD accuracy are not coupled, contra [30].

**ImageNet-C:** contain artificially corrupted / blurred ImageNet images

## DeepAugment:




Figure 4: DeepAugment examples preserve semantics, are data-dependent, and are far more visually diverse than, say, rotations.

# Synthetic data for LLMs

- Pretraining:

**Rephrasing the Web: Recipe for Compute and Data-Efficient Language Modeling** <https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16380>

- Post-training data

- For improving reasoning

**STaR: Bootstrapping Reasoning With Reasoning:**  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.14465>

Train LLM on the reasoning chain that the LLM generated.

**Self-Play Fine-Tuning Converts Weak LMs to Strong LMs**

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01335>

# Self-Instruct: Aligning Language Models with Self-Generated Instructions

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.10560>

*Self-Instruct is a framework that helps language models improve their ability to follow natural language instructions. It does this by using the model's own generations to create a large collection of instructional data. With Self-Instruct, it is possible to improve the instruction-following capabilities of language models without relying on extensive manual annotation.*

Instruction + Instance Input	Target Output	Validity
<b>Instruction:</b> Generate a random password with at least 6 characters.	<pre>def generateRandomPassword():     password = ""     while len(password) &lt; 6:         password += chr(random.randint(65, 90))     return password</pre>	Instruction: ✓ Input: ✓ Output: ✓
<b>Instruction:</b> Write a paragraph describing how to tie shoelaces for people who have never tied their shoes before. explain each step briefly.	Paragraph: To tie shoelaces, first you need to make a loop with one end of the lace. Then pass the other end through the loop and pull it tight. Next, you need to wrap the lace around the shoe several times. Finally, tuck in the loose end into the wrapped part of the lace.	Instruction: ✓ Input: ✓ Output: ✓
<b>Instruction:</b> Given a word, find out its length and its number of vowels. <b>Input:</b> Word = "hello"	Length = 5, Number of vowels = 2	Instruction: ✓ Input: ✓ Output: ✓

Synthetic data for every aspect / every application (on <https://github.com/wasiahmad/Awesome-LLM-Synthetic-Data>)

Math, Code, Text-to-SQL, Alignment, Long Context, Weak-to-Strong, Agents, Vision Language, and for Factualty.

# Synthetic data package “skills” for model to learn



# Why would synthetic data work? Are we getting a “Free Lunch”

- Synthetic data are generated from real data.

True distribution  $\rightarrow$  Real data  $\rightarrow$  Synthetic Data

- Information theorists: “LOL, they have not heard about **data processing inequality**”


$$I(\text{True distribution}; \text{Synthetic data}) \leq I(\text{True distribution}; \text{Real Data})$$

This means that you cannot possibly learn more from synthetic data than from the real data....

# The information theory argument **misses the point** of synthetic data

- We are *far from* being optimally learning information from real data.
- Alternative view:
  - Synthetic data is **part of the design** on how to more efficiently learning from the real data that these synthetic data are based upon.
  - We have one workflow that “works”:
    - SGD-like optimizers + Pretraining + Post-training
    - Change the data so this workflow works better.

Even if you don't want to train on AI generated content --- it's hard to avoid them.



# Today

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- **Model Collapse**
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# Jonah Yi on “Model Collapse”

# Suraj Ranganath on “How to prevent Model Collapse”