

Frames of Reference in Unilateral Neglect and Visual Perception: A Computational Perspective

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Neurological patients with unilateral neglect fail to orient and respond to stimuli on one side, typically the left. A key research issue is whether neglect is exhibited with respect to the left side of the viewer or of objects. When deficits in attentional allocation depend not merely on an object's location with respect to the viewer but on the object's intrinsic extent, shape, or movement, researchers have inferred that attention must be operating in an object-based frame of reference. Simulations of a view-based connectionist model of spatial attention prove that this inference is not logically necessary: Object-based attentional effects can be obtained without object-based frames. The model thus explains away troublesome phenomena for view-based theories of object recognition.

A key question motivating research in perception and attention is how the brain represents visual information. One aspect of this representation is the reference frame with respect to which visual features and their relationships are encoded. The reference frame specifies the center location; the up–down, left–right, and front–back directions; and the relative scale of each axis. Figure 1 shows two different reference frames. In terms of the reference frame centered on the telephone, the buttons would be described as being on top of the base and in front of the handle, whereas in terms of the reference frame centered on the viewer, the buttons would be described as being in back of the base and to the left of the handle. Reference frames can be prescribed by the viewer, objects, or the environment. *Viewer-based*, or *egocentric*, frames are determined by the gaze, head orientation, and/or torso position of the viewer. *Object-based*, or *allocentric*, frames are determined by intrinsic characteristics of an object, such as axes of symmetry or elongation, or knowledge of the object's standard orientation.¹ *Environment-based* frames are based on landmarks in the environment, such as walls in a room, or other absolutes, such as gravity or compass directions.² A frame of reference makes certain information in the stimulus explicit and therefore readily available for use in information processing, and it hides other information, making it less available. Consequently, the appropriateness of one reference frame or another depends fundamentally on the mechanisms posited to operate in recognizing objects, and assumptions concerning the psychological and neurobiological reality of various reference frames serve to distinguish theories of object recognition.

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Object Recognition

The goal of object recognition is to determine the identity or category of an object in a visual scene from the retinal input. In naturalistic scenes, object recognition is a computational challenge because the object may appear in various poses and contexts—that is, in arbitrary positions, orientations, and distances with respect to the viewer and to other objects. Consequently, theories of object recognition must overcome the effect of viewpoint on the appearance of an object. *Viewpoint-invariant recognition*, also known as *object constancy*, is achieved when an object is identified as being the same regardless of its pose.

Object recognition involves matching representations of objects stored in memory to representations extracted from the visual image. The debate in the literature concerns the nature of the representation extracted from the image. Broadly, theories of object recognition might be contrasted along five logically independent dimensions (Hummel, 1994; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1998; Tarr, 1999; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1998):

1. What are the primitive features or parts extracted from the visual image that form the basis of the representation? Features proposed include generalized cylinders, geons (viewpoint-invariant shape primitives, discussed below), local surface patches, contours, and conjunctions of edge segments.

2. How stable is the extracted set of features across transformations of the image? If processing that underlies feature extrac-

¹ The term *object based* can become confusing, because the object on which a frame of reference is based can also be a feature or part of an object. For this reason, I prefer the terms *egocentric* and *allocentric* to refer to frames that might otherwise be called *viewer based* and *object based*. In common usage, *allocentric* can refer to any frame that is not viewer based, but in this article, I use it to describe a frame of reference prescribed by intrinsic properties of the stimulus.

² Alternative terminology for *viewer-based*, *object-based*, and *environment-based* reference frames abounds in the literature. *Retinotopic*, *head centered*, and *body centered* are specific instances of *viewer based*; *stimulus based* is equivalent to *object based*; and *gravitational* and *scene based* are instances of *environment based*.




Figure 1. Two reference frames that can describe the telephone, one of which is intrinsic to the object and the other of which is based on the viewer's gaze. The reference frame prescribes the center location; the up-down, left-right, and front-back directions; and the scale of each axis (indicated by the mark along each axis).

tion produces descriptions of features in an egocentric frame of reference, the set of features obtained will be quite different for two different views of the same object. If processing produces descriptions of features in an allocentric frame of reference, the individual features will be the same regardless of the relationship of the feature to the viewer. The set of features extracted will be viewpoint dependent in the first case and largely viewpoint invariant in the second. If features are described in a frame of reference that is allocentric in some respects (e.g., center position and principal axis of the feature) but egocentric in other respects (e.g., left-right and up-down directions), partial viewpoint invariance will be achieved.

3. How is the configuration of the features encoded? The pose of each feature might be represented with respect to a single frame of reference, or the pose of one feature might be specified relative to the pose(s) of other feature(s).

4. How stable is the representation of a configuration of features across transformations of the image? The configuration might be represented with respect to an egocentric frame, the resulting representation being highly viewpoint dependent; the configuration might be represented with respect to an allocentric frame, the resulting representation being viewpoint invariant; or—as described above—a hybrid egocentric-allocentric frame may be used.

5. What relationships are used to describe the possible configurations? The relationships might range from qualitative (e.g., above) to quantitative (e.g., 1.5 units along the z -axis), with intermediate possibilities (e.g., between 2 and 5 units along the z -axis).

Although theories of object recognition differ in many other regards, these five dimensions have been the primary focus of theoretical debates and behavioral studies. When various theories of object recognition are situated in a space characterized by these five dimensions, contrasts among theories become explicit and clear-cut. Because the five dimensions are fairly independent of one another, it is possible to perform an efficient evaluation over the space of possibilities by considering one or two dimensions at a time.

Traditionally, theories of object recognition have often been divided into two broad classes, *view-based* theories and *structural-description* theories (Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1998; Tarr, 1999).

The key assumption of view-based theories is that the features extracted from the image are viewpoint dependent (Dimension 2) and that configurations of features encoded are also viewpoint dependent (Dimension 4). The key assumption of structural-description theories is that the pose of each feature is represented with respect to other features, not to a global frame of reference (Dimension 3). Because the central assumptions of the two classes focus on different dimensions, the classes are not necessarily incompatible. Historically, however, they have been viewed as antagonistic, in part because of the comparison of specific theories of each class, which make particular assumptions along all five dimensions. I describe several influential theories of each class and then return to the issue of how these theories differ with regard to the frames of reference posited to operate in object recognition.

An early structural-description theory of object recognition was outlined by Marr and Nishihara (1978; see also Marr, 1982; Pinker, 1984). According to this theory, an internal description of an object's structure is constructed from observed visual features, essentially by transforming the viewer-based retinal input into an object-based representation (see Figure 2a)—a representation of the relationship of object parts to one another, independent of the viewer, using allocentric frames of reference for both the parts and configurations. This transformation solves the problem of viewpoint-invariant recognition, because every view of an object maps to the same object-based representation (ignoring the issue of occluded features).

Since Marr and Nishihara's (1978) seminal work, a variety of structural-description theories have been proposed. Some focus on rigid and two-dimensional objects—either implicitly or explicitly—in which case the object-based representation can be constructed using only image-plane transformations and recognition can be achieved in a straightforward manner by matching the object-based representation to stored templates of familiar objects




Figure 2. A sketch of two different approaches to achieving viewpoint-invariant object recognition. (a) In the structural-description theory of Marr (1982), visual features in the retinal image corresponding to an object (the sunglasses) are detected and transformed into a view-invariant representation that captures the three-dimensional structure of the object and the relationships of its parts to one another. Recognition is then performed by matching stored object templates—one per object—to the view-invariant representation. (b) In a neurobiologically motivated view-based theory, many transformations of the features in the visual input are considered in parallel, and typically recognition is achieved by means of a multistage hierarchical process that constructs increasingly complex featural representations with increasing viewpoint invariance. The pyramid structure indicates the transformation from low-order to high-order features while simultaneously factoring out some position, scale, and possibly orientation specificity. Recognition is performed by matching the representation at the top of the pyramid to stored object templates, where multiple templates of the same object are required to achieve complete viewpoint invariance.

(Hinton, 1981; Humphreys & Heinke, 1998; Olshausen, Anderson, & van Essen, 1993; Zemel, Mozer, & Hinton, 1988).

Other structural-description theories in psychology tackle the task of recognizing the sorts of objects encountered in the real world—complex, articulated objects with three-dimensional structure (Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996, 1998). In the style of Marr and Nishihara (1978), these theories operate on structural descriptions that decompose an object into its parts. Structural descriptions can be hierarchical, decomposing parts into parts of parts. The parts are described in terms of a relatively small catalog of primitives. Parts are linked by a small vocabulary of spatial relationships that describe how one part is situated with respect to another.

For example, the influential Biederman (1987) theory invokes 36 primitives, called *geons*. Geons are detected by nonaccidental properties in an image. The attributes of a geon include whether its edges are straight or curved; whether its size is constant, expanded, or contracted; and whether it is symmetric about one or more axes. The relationships among geons are captured by qualitative properties such as whether one geon is larger than another; whether one geon is above, below, or to the side of another; and whether the geons are joined end to end or end to side. Because in principle any shape can be described by the finite set of primitives and relationships, the Biederman theory allows for the representation of novel shapes. Geons and their relationships can be represented by a graph structure, and recognition of an unknown shape can be performed by matching the structure of the unknown shape to the structure of a stored object.

Hummel and Biederman (1992), Hummel (1994), and Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996, 1998) have proposed structural-description theories that differ from the Biederman (1987) theory along certain dimensions. All have proposed frames of reference for describing features and their configurations that are at least partially egocentric. In addition, the model of Hummel and Stankiewicz (1998) can accommodate quantitative as well as qualitative spatial relationships.

Turning now to view-based theories, consider a naive scheme in which two-dimensional images of viewed objects are stored during learning, and these stored templates are matched pixel by pixel to an image containing an object to be recognized. Although this scheme seems hopelessly simplistic, minor variants of the scheme achieve a surprising degree of generalization to novel poses of three-dimensional objects by interpolation between stored poses (Beymer, 1993; Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Poggio & Shelton, 1999; Seibert & Waxman, 1990; Ullman, 1989; Weinshall, Edelman, & Bülthoff, 1990). In view-based theories, viewpoint-invariant recognition is achieved by means of multiple characteristic poses being stored in memory (Perrett, Oram, Hietanen, & Benson, 1999).

View-based theories that focus on explaining human vision go beyond the simple two-dimensional template-matching idea by taking into account the coarse-scale anatomy of visual cortex (Fukushima & Miyake, 1982; Hubel & Wiesel, 1979; Le Cun et al., 1989; Mozer, 1991; Perrett & Oram, 1998; Reisenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Sandon & Uhr, 1988; Wallis & Rolls, 1997). Specifically, two properties of visual cortex are generally deemed relevant. First, visual cortex is hierarchically organized, with simple, low-order, view-specific feature detectors at the earliest stage of vision, and increasingly complex, higher order, and view-

invariant detectors at subsequent stages (depicted in Figure 2b by the pyramid structure). Second, information is processed from many locations in the visual field simultaneously and at many scales and orientations. Rather than being forced to choose a single reference frame, parallelism of the visual system allows multiple transformations of detectors at each stage in the hierarchy. In this framework, the focus of processing is on extracting features that reliably indicate the presence of an object, not on constructing a view-invariant representation. Nonetheless, a partially view-invariant representation may come to dominate later stages of processing in the service of recognition.

The issue of reference frames in theories of object recognition plays out in two ways. First, view-based theories make the strong claim that objects are encoded in a view-dependent manner at all stages of recognition (see Figure 2b), and thus features and their configurations are encoded with respect to egocentric frames. Second, several classic structural-description theories (Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982) suppose a stage of processing at which objects achieve a view-invariant representation (Figure 2a), and thus features and their configurations are encoded with respect to allocentric frames. Although other theories lie somewhere between these extremes (e.g., Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1998), the viability of many theories of object recognition depends on the frames of reference used by the brain to encode features and their configurations: The existence of allocentric frames would be debilitating for view-based theories on grounds of parsimony, and the failure to find allocentric frames would be troublesome for theories that posit such representations are necessary for object recognition (Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982).

Evidence for View-Invariant Representations

In recent years, there has been a continuing heated debate between proponents of view-based and structural-description theories (Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1995; Biederman & Kalocsai, 1997; Edelman, 1997; Edelman & Duvdevani-Bar, 1997; Perrett et al., 1999; Tarr, 1999; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995), a significant component of which has been focused on the neurobiological and psychological reality of view-invariant representations, or equivalently, allocentric frames of reference. I summarize some of the key evidence that has been fodder for the debate. I sort the evidence into three categories: neuroscientific, behavioral, and computational.

Neurophysiological studies have not identified a stage in visual information processing at which cells fire in a completely view-invariant manner. Rather, even at the latest purely visual stages of processing in monkeys, such as Area TE of inferotemporal cortex, cells remain somewhat sensitive to viewing angle and articulation poses for objects, faces, and geometrical shapes (Logothetis & Pauls, 1995; Perrett & Oram, 1998; Tanaka, 1993, 1996). Indeed, for faces, cells are tuned to characteristic views, consistent with view-based theories (Perrett et al., 1999).

The behavioral evidence concerning the viewpoint invariance of object representations and recognition performance is somewhat more ambiguous. For example, Ellis, Allport, Humphreys, and Collis (1989) asked subjects whether two pictured objects had the same name. A benefit was found if the two familiar objects were the same, even from different viewpoints, suggesting the use of allocentric representations. However, a benefit was also found if

the objects were presented from the same viewing angle and were of the same size.

Psychophysical support has been found for view-specific object representations (Tarr, 1995; Vetter, Hurlbert, & Poggio, 1995), as well as for theories positing multiple specific views with interpolation between (Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992; Edelman & Bülthoff, 1992). Tarr and Pinker (1990; see also McMullen & Farah, 1991) observed the use of object-based frames only in special cases of recognition but suggested that the ordinary visual reference frame is tied to egocentric coordinates.

In studies using novel, compositional objects, viewpoint-invariant recognition is achieved for rotation in depth (Biederman & Bar, 1999; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993; see further discussion by Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1995; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995). Some studies have shown that perception of unfamiliar three-dimensional objects is aided by prior exposure to objects at a particular viewpoint and is disrupted by rotation in depth (Bülthoff, Edelman, & Tarr, 1995), but such data may not be evidence against allocentric representations, as even Biederman's (1987) theory does not predict invariance for all objects and views. Recently, however, costs in recognition time and accuracy have been found for viewpoint changes in recognizing single geons of the sort postulated by Biederman's theory (Tarr, Williams, Hayward, & Gauthier, 1998).

Complementing the evidence for and against view-invariant representations from experimental studies are arguments about the computational complexity and feasibility of object recognition under the two different classes of theories. A major issue faced by view-based theories is explaining how they can generalize to novel objects and novel viewing conditions (Tarr, 1999; but see Reisenhuber & Poggio, 1999, for a promising model in this regard) and how they can be used to achieve broad category-level judgments (Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996). Alternative theories, in turn, must be computationally sufficient to extract three-dimensional structure from images in a primarily bottom-up fashion, which has proven difficult to achieve.³

The neurobiological, psychological, and computational evidence summarized above is mixed but somewhat favors the notion that cortical representations involved in ordinary object recognition are view dependent and, thus, that egocentric reference frames form the basis of perception. However, there exists another rich source of data diagnostic of the neurobiological and psychological reality of allocentric frames of reference, originating in the neuropsychological literature on the study of patients with unilateral neglect. The interest in neglect has been intense, in large part because neglect appears to provide compelling support for the existence of object-based frames of reference. The data seem particularly clear because stimuli studied have involved rigid two-dimensional objects, stripping away much of the complexity involved in object recognition, allowing a view-invariant representation to be established via a single object-based frame of reference. In the following section, I describe neglect and its relation to theories of object recognition.

Unilateral Neglect

Damage to parietal cortex can cause patients to fail to orient toward, explore, and respond to stimuli on the contralesional side of space (Farah, 1990; Heilman, Watson, & Valenstein, 1993).

This disorder, known as *unilateral neglect*, can compromise visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory modalities and may involve personal, extrapersonal, and imaginal space (Halligan & Marshall, 1993). Unilateral neglect is more frequent, longer lasting, and more severe following lesions to the right hemisphere than to the left. Consequently, all descriptions in this article refer to right-hemisphere damage and neglect of stimuli on the left. There is one key question surrounding unilateral visual neglect: With respect to what reference frame is left neglect manifested?

In ordinary viewing situations, viewer-based and object-based frames of reference are often confounded as when viewers, seated upright, fixate on an upright object immediately in front of them. Consequently, clever behavioral experiments have been designed to dissociate various reference frames and determine the contribution of each to neglect. In multiple experiments, patients show a deficit in attentional allocation that depends not merely on the location of an object with respect to the viewer, but on the extent, shape, or movement of the object itself. From this finding of *object-based neglect*, the inference is often made that attentional allocation must be operating in an object-based frame of reference and, consequently, that object-based frames of reference are central to visual information processing. The observation of object-based neglect suggests the existence of view-invariant representations and therefore is antagonistic to view-based theories and supportive of the theories of Biederman (1987) and Marr (1982).

The point of this work is to show that this inference is not logically necessary: Object-based attentional effects can be obtained without object-based reference frames. Consequently, the bulk of the neglect data that has been mustered as strong support for theories of object recognition such as Biederman's (1987) and Marr's (1982) is equally consistent with view-based theories. I argue this point by means of a computational model that makes use of only viewer-based frames yet can account for data from a broad variety of experimental studies that were interpreted as supporting object-based frames. Through simulations of the computational model, it becomes evident that the data are trickier to interpret than one might at first imagine.

In the next section, I present the model and explain key principles of the model that, as described below, allow it to account for data. Then, I show simulation results for several different studies. I conclude with a discussion of other data in the literature that have been used as evidence for and against the neurobiological reality of object-based frames.

A Connectionist Model of Visual Perception and Attention

MORSEL (Mozer, 1991; Mozer & Sitton, 1998) is a connectionist model of *multiple object recognition* and attentional *selection*. The model has previously been used to explain a large corpus of experimental data, including perceptual errors that arise when several shapes appear simultaneously in the visual field, facilita-

³ Interactive approaches in which object-based representations and object identity are determined in parallel through a constraint satisfaction search (e.g., Humphreys & Heinke, 1998) have proven difficult to scale up, because of the massive combinatorial search that has many local optima (Hinton & Lang, 1985; O'Reilly, Munakata, & McClelland, 2000, chapter 6).




Figure 3. Key components of MORSEL, a model of multiple object recognition and attentional selection (Mozer, 1991). MORSEL includes a recognition network, the first stages of which are depicted on the right, and an attentional mechanism.

tory effects of context and redundant information, visual search performance, attentional cuing effects, reading deficits in neglect dyslexia (Mozer & Behrmann, 1992), and line bisection performance in neglect (Mozer, Halligan, & Marshall, 1997). MORSEL (see Figure 3) includes a *recognition network* that can identify multiple shapes in parallel and in arbitrary locations of the visual field but has capacity limitations. It is a view-based theory of the sort depicted in Figure 2b. MORSEL also includes an *attentional mechanism*, or AM for short, that determines where in the visual field to focus processing resources.

Visual input presented to MORSEL is encoded by a set of feature detectors arrayed on a topographic map. The detectors are of five *primitive feature types*: oriented line segments at 0°, 45°, 90°, and 135° and line-segment terminators (ends of line segments). Figure 4 shows a sample input to MORSEL, four letters centered on corners of a square, where the representation of each letter occupies a 3 × 3 region of the topographic map. The upper panel presents the superimposed features, and the bottom panels separate the topographic map by feature type. In these separate maps, a dark symbol indicates activity of the detector for the given

feature at the particular location, and a light symbol indicates inactivity. Activity from the topographic map innervates both the recognition network and the AM.

In my earlier modeling work, I stipulated that the topographic map is in a viewer-based reference frame, meaning that the input representation changes as the viewer moves through the world. However, this earlier work did not require a commitment as to the precise nature of the viewer-based frame, whether it be retinotopic, head centered, or body centered. Because the experimental paradigms that were simulated in this work confound eye, head, and body position, the various viewer-based frames are equivalent, and no specific commitment is required now either.

MORSEL is primarily a model of psychological structures, not neurobiological structures. One might treat MORSEL's primitive visual features as corresponding to primary visual cortex, the AM as corresponding to parietal cortex, and the recognition network as being situated in the temporal pathway. Beyond this loose fit to neurobiology, I do not commit to a neurobiological instantiation at present. I instead treat MORSEL as a psychological-level theory which describes functional processing in neocortex. Consequently, I characterize processing units in the model in terms of their functional properties, not neurobiology. For example, the left visual field is represented by units on the left side of the primitive feature maps, even though those units would correspond to V1 neurons in the right cerebral hemisphere.

MORSEL is also not intended as a model of human development. The recognition network is trained to reproduce adult competence, but MORSEL makes no claims as to the nature of developmental processes that give rise to adult competence in visual perception. The connectivity of the AM is determined by principles described in the next section. The connectivity is fixed in all simulations; connectionist learning procedures are not involved.

MORSEL is a comprehensive model consisting of not only the recognition network and AM depicted in Figure 3 but several other elements that were sidestepped because of their irrelevance to the present work. Simulating the entire model can be a problem,




Figure 4. Top: Sample input to MORSEL, consisting of the letters A, C, D, and X, encoded in terms of five primitive features—line segments at four orientations and segment terminators (circles). Bottom: Feature map activity corresponding to the sample input. A dark symbol indicates the activity of the detector for a particular feature in a particular location; a faint symbol indicates inactivity.

because it is difficult to identify which components or properties of the model are responsible for producing a certain behavior. Consequently, my strategy has been to simulate only the critical components of the model and to make simple assumptions concerning the operation of other components. I adopted this strategy in the present work and used only the AM to account for data from unilateral neglect, much as was done in Mozer et al. (1997).

The AM

The AM is a set of processing units in one-to-one correspondence with the locations in the topographic map. Activity in an AM unit indicates the salience of the corresponding location and serves to gate the flow of activity from feature detectors at that location in the topographic map into the recognition network (indicated in Figure 3 by the connections from the AM into the recognition network); the more active an AM unit is, the more likely that features in the corresponding location of the topographic map will be detected and analyzed by the recognition network. However, the AM serves only to bias processing: Features from unattended locations are not absolutely inhibited but

have a lower probability of being detected by the recognition network.

Each unit in the AM receives bottom-up, or *exogenous*, input from the detectors in the corresponding location of the topographic map (indicated in Figure 3 by the connections from the primitive features to the AM). Each unit in the AM can also receive top-down, or *endogenous*, input from higher centers in the model, but this aspect of the model is barely used in the present research. Given the exogenous and endogenous input, cooperative and competitive dynamics within the AM cause a subset of locations to be activated.

Figure 5 shows an example of the AM in operation. Each panel depicts the state of the AM after various numbers of processing time steps, or iterations, assuming a 15×15 topographic map. The area of a black square is proportional to the exogenous input at that location in the topographic map. The area of a white square is proportional to the AM activity. The white squares are superimposed on top of the black; consequently, the exogenous input is not visible at locations with AM activity. Initially, at Iteration 0, the AM is reset and has no activity. Three distinct blobs of feature activity are evident on the input, but as processing proceeds, the




Figure 5. Example of the operation of the attentional mechanism (AM). Each panel depicts the state of the AM at a particular processing iteration, assuming a 15×15 topographic map. The area of a black square is proportional to the exogenous input at that location in the topographic map. The area of a white square is proportional to the AM activity. The white squares are superimposed on top of the black; consequently, the exogenous input is not visible at locations with AM activity. The exogenous input pattern indicates three objects. The largest one, producing the strongest input, is in the upper left portion of the field. By iteration 20, the AM has reached equilibrium and has selected the region surrounding the largest object.

AM selects the largest blob. Note that the input blobs do not indicate the type or precise arrangement of features, just the total activity in a region. Although the model appears to have formed a spotlight of attention, the dynamics of the model do not mandate the selection of a convex region, or even a single region. Typically, however, a single region is selected, and the selected region conforms to the shape of objects in the visual input, tapering off at object boundaries. Under certain circumstances, the model can select multiple regions as one of the simulations below demonstrates.

The operation of the AM is based on three principles concerning the allocation of spatial attention, which most would view as noncontroversial: (a) Attention is directed to locations in the visual field where objects appear, as well as to other task-relevant locations; (b) attention is directed to contiguous regions of the visual field; and (c) attention has a selective function—it should choose some regions of the visual field over others. These abstract principles concerning the direction of attention can be incorporated into a computational model such as the AM by translating them into rules of activation, such as the following:

1. Locations containing visual features should be activated. This rule provides a bias on unit activity (i.e., all else being equal, the principle indicates whether a unit should be on or off). One can see this rule at work in Figure 5, where the initial activity of the AM (upper-middle frame) is based on the exogenous input (upper left frame).

2. Locations adjacent to activated locations should also be activated. This rule results in cooperation between neighboring units and is manifested in Figure 5 by the increase in activity over time for the blob in the upper-left portion of the field.

3. Locations whose activity is the weakest should be suppressed. This rule results in competition between units and is manifested in Figure 5 by the decrease in activity for the two lower blobs once the upper left blob begins to dominate in activity.

These three rules qualitatively describe the operation of the model. The model can be characterized quantitatively through an update equation, which expresses the activity of a processing unit in the AM as a function of the input to the AM and the activities of other AM units. If we denote the activity of an AM unit at location (x, y) in the topographic map at a particular time t by $a_{xy}(t)$, then its new activity at the following time step is expressed as

$$a_{xy}(t+1) = f \left(a_{xy}(t) + exo_{xy} + \mu \sum_{i_j \in \text{NEIGH}_{xy}} [a_{ij}(t) - a_{xy}(t)] - \theta [\bar{a}(t) - a_{xy}(t)] \right), \quad (1)$$

where exo_{xy} is the exogenous input to the AM from features in the topographic map at location (x, y) ; f is a linear threshold function that caps activity at 0 and 1,

$$f(z) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } z < 0 \\ z & \text{if } 0 \leq z \leq 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } z > 1 \end{cases};$$

and NEIGH_{xy} is the set of eight locations adjacent to (x, y) . The first term on the right side of Equation 1, $a_{xy}(t)$, causes a unit to sustain its activity over time. The second term, exo_{xy} , implements

the bias rule. The third term implements the cooperation rule by causing an increase in activity when a unit is less active than its neighbors. Because it also causes a decrease in activity when a unit is more active than its neighbors, the third term can be viewed as encouraging a unit to take on the average value of its neighbors. Finally, the fourth term in Equation 1 implements the competition rule by causing a decrease in activity when a unit is less active than $\bar{a}(t)$, a measure of the average activity of AM, defined below. The parameters μ and θ are positive and weight the contribution to the activation dynamics of the cooperation and competition rules, respectively.

The most natural mechanism to perform selection is a winner-take-all competition rule, rather than the *comparison-to-average* competition rule I propose. Indeed, nearly every other connectionist model of attention uses a winner-take-all rule. A winner-take-all rule involves inhibition of a fixed magnitude between each pair of locations. With a winner-take-all rule, the total inhibition in the network rises and falls with the total activity in the network. Through this simple negative feedback loop, the network achieves homeostasis at a fixed level of activity, that is, a distribution of attention of roughly fixed area. Because the size of the attentional spotlight has been shown to vary with task demands and stimulus properties (e.g., Halligan & Marshall, 1994; Hillis, Mordkoff, & Caramazza, 1999; LaBerge, 1983), the comparison-to-average competition rule, which allows both small and large distributions of attention, was devised. If a region of the AM map has uniform activity, the comparison-to-average competition rule will support that level of activity, regardless of the size of the region. What matters is the homogeneity of activation within a region and the activation of one region relative to another. If units in one region have more initial support than units in another region, and the support within a region is homogeneous, the competition rule will cause one region to be selected over the other. Contrary to the standard conception of a spotlight of attention, the comparison-to-average competition rule will allow two regions to be simultaneously active if they have nearly identical support, a property I later make use of to explain data.

The computation of the average activity, \bar{a} , requires some additional explanation. The fourth term in Equation 1 causes a unit's activity to be inhibited in proportion to \bar{a} . If \bar{a} were simply the mean activity level of all AM units—that is,

$$\bar{a}(t) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{x,y} a_{xy},$$

where n is the number of units in the AM—the level of inhibition would rise or fall as the total activity rises or falls, driving the total activity to remain roughly constant; consequently, the AM would tend to select a fixed-size region. The AM should be capable of attending to small or large regions, depending on the stimulus and task environment. This property was achieved by modulating the inhibition between each pair of units by the number of active units, instead of having what amounts to fixed inhibition between units. That is, \bar{a} is defined as the mean activation considering only the active units, computed by replacing n with n_{ACT} , the number of active units:

$$n_{\text{ACT}} = \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \sum_{x,y} \frac{a_{xy}}{\epsilon + a_{xy}}.$$

As ϵ approaches zero, n_{ACT} becomes simply the number of units with positive activity levels.

In the original model, it turned out that to control the behavior of the AM, an additional depreciation factor, γ , was needed in the definition of \bar{a} :

$$\bar{a}(t) = \frac{\gamma}{n_{\text{ACT}}} \sum_{x,y} a_{xy},$$

where $0 < \gamma \leq 1$. If $\gamma = 1$, a unit must have an activity level above the mean to remain on, but if $\gamma < 1$, the mean is depreciated and units whose activity is slightly below the mean will not be suppressed.

To grasp the activation function intuitively, consider the time course of activation as depicted in Figure 5. Initially, the activity of all AM units is reset to zero. When a stimulus display is presented, features are activated in the topographic map, which provides exogenous input to the AM (the second term in Equation 1). Units with active neighbors will grow the fastest because of neighborhood support (the third term). As the flow of activation progresses, high-support neighborhoods will have activity above the mean and they will therefore be pushed even higher, whereas low-support neighborhoods will experience the opposite tendency (the fourth term).

Lesioning the AM to Produce Neglect

In modeling data from neglect dyslexia (Mozer & Behrmann, 1992) and line bisection (Mozer et al., 1997), we proposed a particular form of lesion to the model—damaging the connections from the primitive feature maps to the AM. The damage is graded monotonically; it is most severe at the left extreme of the topographic map and least severe at the right (assuming a right-hemisphere lesion as I do throughout this article). Figure 6 depicts the damaged connections into the AM. The graded damage is important, because it results in a relative preference for the right; complete destruction of the connections in the left field and fully intact connections in the right field would yield a qualitatively different sort of behavior. The graded damage proposed is motivated by Kinsbourne's (1987, 1993) orientational bias account of neglect.

The damage is described in functional terms—that is, how the damage affects the operation of the model. The model is neutral with regard to the neurobiological basis of this damage—that is, how a unilateral brain lesion results in damage of this functional




Figure 6. A sketch of the attentional mechanism (AM) and some of its inputs from the primitive feature maps. Each feature detector connects to the homologous unit in the AM. In neglect, graded damage to these connections is hypothesized, resulting in feature detectors that are less effective in activating the AM. The damage is depicted by the fainter connections toward the left side of the field.

form. Additional assumptions will be required to specify the model at a neurobiological level. Other psychological-level theories of neglect face the same challenge. The neurobiological-level theory of Pouget and Sejnowski (1997) suggests that the gradient of attention following a unilateral brain lesion arises by way of gradients of representation in intact parietal cortex: The left hemisphere has a weak representation of the left side of space and a strong representation of the right side, and the right hemisphere is the mirror opposite. Consequently, damage to the right hemisphere leaves only the left hemisphere representation, which has a weak-to-strong gradient of representation from left to right. Note that even this neurobiological model makes an assumption of a gradient, although it is a gradient in the intact model, not a gradient resulting from damage. Such a gradient could easily be incorporated into the AM by splitting the model into two copies localized in the left and right parietal cortices. Each copy operates autonomously with weak cross-connections to keep the two networks synchronized. The input to the left-hemisphere AM from the primitive feature maps would be weak to strong from left to right. The input to the right-hemisphere AM would be reversed: strong to weak from left to right. Damage to the right hemisphere would leave only the left-hemisphere AM, which has the input gradient Mozer and Behrmann (1992) proposed to model neglect. A more elegant account may be feasible: Shillcock and Cairns (1995) presented a simple connectionist model in which a gradient of damage emerges from a hemispheric model in which no representational gradients are built in.

Mozer and Behrmann's (1992) proposal for a graded lesion of the inputs to the AM can be contrasted with two alternatives. First, one might damage the visual recognition network itself. However, this would lead to blindness and is inconsistent with the view of neglect as an attentional phenomenon and with the neuroanatomical lesion sites that give rise to neglect. Second, one might lesion the AM directly, changing either the activation dynamics or the connectivity of the units such that damaged units integrate activity more slowly or have a weakened influence on the activity of other units. I conjecture that these types of lesions would yield a behavioral effect similar to the proposed lesion for the simulation studies reported in this article.

The damage depicted in Figure 6 affects the probability that primitive visual features are detected by the AM. To the extent that features in a given location fail to trigger attention, the AM will fail to focus attention at that location. Thus, the deficit is not "perceptual," in the sense that if somehow attention can be mustered, features will be analyzed normally by the recognition network. For example, the lesioned AM shows extinction: When a single stimulus is presented, it will be attended and recognized, but when two stimuli are presented side by side, the left stimulus is suppressed because of the simultaneous presence of the right stimulus (Mozer & Behrmann, 1992).

The nature of the attentional deficit is specified by means of a function relating the horizontal position of a feature on the topographic map to the probability that the feature will be transmitted to the corresponding location of the AM (see Figure 7). The function is piecewise linear with a flat segment, followed by a segment with positive slope, followed by another flat segment. The left and right extremes of the curve represent the left and right edges of the topographic map, respectively. The probability that




Figure 7. The transmission-probability curve representing the damage to the model's attentional system. This function relates the position of a feature in the viewer-centered frame to the probability that the feature will be detected by the corresponding unit of the attentional mechanism (AM). The function is for a patient with left neglect; the probability that the AM will register a feature is low in the left field and is monotonically nondecreasing further to the right.

the AM will register a feature is low in the left field and is monotonically nondecreasing further to the right.

The function is characterized by four parameters: (a) the minimum transmission probability (*anchor probability*), (b) the horizontal position in the topographic map at which the probability begins to rise (*anchor position*), (c) the slope of the rising segment (*gradient*), and (d) the probability of feature transmission on the right extreme of the topographic map (*saturation probability*). This parameterization allows a variety of transmission functions, including forms corresponding to individuals with no brain damage (e.g., a minimum probability close to 1 and a gradient of 0), a homogeneous slope across the entire field (e.g., a shallow gradient and a saturation position at the far right edge), and a sharp discontinuity at the hemifield crossing (a very steep gradient and a saturation position just to the right of center). Presumably the exact nature of the function varies from patient to patient. Regardless of the specific form of damage, I emphasize that the damage is to a viewer-centered representation of space.

General Simulation Methodology

The AM as described is identical to the model used in our (Mozer & Behrmann, 1992; Mozer et al., 1997) earlier simulation studies of neglect. However, the nature of the model's input was changed in one minor respect. In the earlier simulation studies, when a stimulus display was presented to the model, the exogenous input to the AM was determined probabilistically based on the stimulus display and the transmission-probability function (see Figure 7). The exogenous input then remained constant as the AM settled. However, when the display itself is not static—as is the case in one simulation reported here—the exogenous input cannot be static. Consequently, in these simulations, I resampled the stochastic exogenous input at each time step of the simulation. This resampling had no systematic effect for static displays but allowed simulation of the AM for dynamic displays.

The AM has three parameters: μ , θ , and γ . In earlier simulations using the AM, μ was fixed at $\frac{1}{8}$ and θ at $\frac{1}{2}$. These values were used in the present research as well. The third parameter, γ , is dependent on the amount of activity in the stimulus display. In

earlier simulations, Mozer and Behrmann (1992) devised a formula for setting γ based on the total exogenous input to the AM, exo_0 , and a metaparameter γ' that modulates the fraction of the locations that provide exogenous input to the AM that should be selected by the AM:

$$\gamma = \min \left[1.00, \max \left(.75, \frac{exo_0}{\gamma'} \right) \right].$$

γ' was originally conceived as task and stimulus independent, and earlier simulations of the AM used a constant γ' . However, I discovered in the present work—which covers a much wider variety of stimulus displays than the previous simulations—that γ' had to be set for each experimental task. It was the only free parameter of the model and roughly corresponds to the degree of selectivity required to perform the task. Consequently, the setting of γ' depends on the density and distribution of features in a display. The adjustment was primarily performed to obtain sensible behavior from the AM, not to fit simulation data to human data. The model's behavior was qualitatively robust to the choice of γ' . However, if γ' was too large, the AM would fail to be selective, and if γ' was too small, all activity in the AM would die out. I set γ' to 240 for simulations of Behrmann and Tipper (1994; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996) and Driver and Halligan (1991), 220 for simulations of Behrmann and Tipper (1999), 110 for simulations of Arguin and Bub (1993), 650 for simulations of Pavlovskaya, Glass, Soroker, Blum, and Groswasser (1997), and 70 for simulations of Driver, Baylis, Goodrich, and Rafal (1994). From a rational analysis perspective (Anderson, 1990), one might think of γ' as an adjustable parameter of the cognitive architecture that is tuned to optimize performance.

In Mozer et al. (1997), a range of lesions was simulated by varying the four parameters in the transmission-probability curve. For the present work, however, I chose a single lesion profile that had produced typical results in the earlier work. This profile had an anchor probability of .30 and a saturation probability of .90. The anchor position was at the left edge of the topographic map, and the gradient was chosen such that saturation was reached $\frac{5}{6}$ of the way to the right edge of the topographic map. For the unlesioned model, the anchor and saturation probabilities were both .9. All simulations used a topographic map of dimensions 36×36 , except for the Arguin and Bub (1993) simulation, which required a 10×61 topographic map to allow for variation in the horizontal position of the stimuli.⁴

Simulating an experimental task requires that the experimental stimuli be mapped to a pattern of exogenous input to the AM. As in earlier simulations of the AM, the mapping was accomplished by laying a silhouette of the stimulus over the topographic map and setting the exogenous input at all locations covered by the silhouette to .10 except along the stimulus contour, where the exogenous input is raised to .20 to reflect the contrast along the border. Further, as in the past, I assumed a slight amount of blurring of the exogenous input: Each stimulus location provided input to not only the corresponding location of the AM but also the immediately adjacent locations, with a relative strength of 2%. This very slight

⁴ I conceived of the larger topographic map as representing the same visual field region as the smaller map but at a higher resolution.

spread is unlikely to affect processing, but I preserved it to maintain consistency with the original simulations.

The experimental tasks simulated have as their dependent variable the response time to detect or identify a target. Rather than running the full MORSEL model and using the object-recognition network to determine detection or identification responses, I made a simple readout assumption that allowed me to perform a simulation using only the AM. The assumption is that the reaction time to detect or identify a target is inversely proportional to the attentional activation in locations that correspond to the target. This assumption is justified by earlier simulations of MORSEL (Mozer, 1991), in which output activity of the recognition network was found to be monotonically related to the allocation of attention to locations of a target. Because the propagation of activity in MORSEL is temporally extended, I used not the instantaneous activation of the AM but rather the mean activity of the AM over the 20 iterations following target onset. The results described in the following sections are not sensitive to the specific readout assumptions; results are qualitatively similar if the mean activity is computed over 10 or 40 iterations instead of 20, or if the mean activity is mapped to response time by any monotonic transformation. Because trials will vary because of random effects of the transmission-probability curve, I averaged activation across multiple trials in each experimental condition.

Simulations

Behrmann and Tipper (1994) and Tipper and Behrmann (1996)

When an experimental stimulus is presented upright and centered on the fixation point, viewer-centered and object-centered reference frames are confounded. To dissociate the two frames, Behrmann and Tipper (1994) rotated a display containing a “barbell”—two disks, one colored red and the other blue, connected by a solid bar. The barbell first appeared with, say, the red disk on the left and the blue disk on the right. It remained stationary for 1 s, allowing subjects to establish an object-based frame of reference. In the moving condition, the barbell then rotated 180° (see Figure 8a) such that the blue disk ended up on the left and the red disk on the right—the two disks had exchanged places (see Figure 8b). Following the rotation, the red disk appeared on the left with respect to the object-based frame, but on the right with respect to the viewer-based frame. The subjects’ task was to detect a target appearing on either the red or the blue disk. A static condition, in which the barbell did not rotate, was used as a baseline (see Figure 8b). Subjects with left neglect showed facilitation for tar-




Figure 8. Barbell stimulus used in the Behrmann and Tipper (1994) experiment. The disk labeled *R* is colored red, the disk labeled *B* is colored blue. In the moving condition, the initial display (a) was rotated 180°, resulting in the left and right disks’ exchanging places (b). In the static condition, no rotation occurred (b).

gets appearing on the blue disk in the moving condition relative to the static condition and showed inhibition for targets appearing on the red disk. Essentially, the laterality of neglect reversed with reversal of the barbell. Results were therefore consistent with object-based, not viewer-based, neglect.

Tipper and Behrmann (1996) ruled out an explanation for this phenomenon in terms of overt tracking by eye movements. They also showed that the phenomenon appeared to depend on the disks being encoded as one object: In contrast to the condition depicted in Figure 8 in which the two disks are connected, when the bar between the disks is removed—the disconnected condition—the reversal of neglect no longer occurred when the disks rotated. This finding is what one would expect if neglect occurred in an object-based frame, because rotation of the display no longer corresponds to rotation of a single object.

The moving condition in the AM was simulated by presenting a horizontal barbell for 50 iterations and then rotating it 180° over the next 400 iterations, followed immediately by the target. The static condition was simulated by presenting the horizontal barbell for 200 iterations, followed immediately by the target. Encoding the rotating stimulus in a discrete array of cells is complicated because of quantization effects. I did not attempt to hand design an exogenous input pattern for the barbell at every angle θ ; rather, the exogenous input was automatically generated from the exogenous input for the horizontal barbell stimulus as follows. For each location (x, y) , a new coordinate (x', y') was computed by θ° rotation. Because x' and y' are in general noninteger, the exogenous input at (x, y) could not be copied to (x', y') directly. x' and y' were not rounded to the nearest integers; rather, the exogenous input at (x, y) was then split up according to the distance of (x', y') to the four integer grid locations surrounding it. This procedure minimized quantization effects that arose from the coarse representation of the topographic map.

As explained earlier, it was assumed that the attentional activity in a region of space is related to the speed and accuracy of information processing in that region. In the Behrmann and Tipper (1994) experiment, the critical regions are those of the two disks. Readout from the model was performed by calculating the mean attentional activity directed toward each disk, averaged over all locations containing features of the disk and over the 20 iterations following the trial and over 200 trials, referred to as the *readout activity*. Greater readout activity for a disk indicates a shorter response time to the target appearing in that disk.

Figure 9 shows a trial of the unlesioned AM in the moving-barbell condition. The unlesioned model has a uniform transmission probability of .90 across the field, producing occasional missing features in the exogenous input as can be seen in the upper left panel. As the figure shows, attention is rapidly deployed to the entire barbell and remains with the barbell as it rotates. This result is not altogether trivial, as the model had never been tested on dynamic stimuli. The readout activity was .99 for both the left and right disks. (With regard to the disks and targets, *left* and *right* refer to viewer-centered locations.) The attentional state before rotation begins, at Iteration 50, gives a good indication of the readout activity in the static condition, which was also .99 for left and right disks. Thus, the unlesioned AM shows no difference in target detection time among conditions—moving versus static, left versus right target, and connected versus disconnected disks.




Figure 9. One trial of the unlesioned model on the Behrmann and Tipper (1994) rotating-barbell stimulus. Attentional activation (white squares) follows the exogenous input (black squares) as the barbell rotates.

The lesioned AM shows quite different behavior (see Figure 10). A relative degradation to the exogenous input on the left side of the barbell can be observed due to the transmission-probability curve, causing the right half of the barbell to be selected initially. As the barbell begins to rotate, the focus of attention narrows further to just the disk, because the disk provides the greatest amount of exogenous input. As rotation continues, attentional activity lags slightly behind the exogenous input, because of limits on the time course of activation transmission, but catches up when the rotation is completed. Given the final distribution of attention in the moving condition, the model will be faster to respond to a target on the left than on the right. This reversal does not occur in

the static condition, as suggested by the AM state at Iteration 50. The trial depicted in Figure 10 is representative; it is consistent with the more quantitative measure of readout activity (see Table 1, connected condition), which indicates greater activity for the left disk in the moving versus the static condition, and less activity for the right disk.

When the disks are disconnected, attention jumps from the disk that started off on the left to the disk that ends up on the left (see Figure 11). After the disks cross the midline, the disk rotating into the right field begins to receive more support from the exogenous input than the disk rotating into the left field. Eventually this exogenous support is sufficient to activate the right disk, and




Figure 10. One trial of the lesioned model on the Behrmann and Tipper (1994) rotating-barbell stimulus.

Table 1
Readout Activity From the Lesioned Attentional Mechanism in the Experimental Conditions of Tipper and Behrmann (1996)

Condition	Left disk	Right disk
	Connected	
Moving	.22	.04
Static	.00	.99
	Disconnected	
Moving	.00	.93
Static	.00	.99

competition acts to suppress the left disk. This pattern is observed reliably as indicated by the measure of readout activity (see Table 1, disconnected condition). The readout activity shows nearly full activity to the right disk and none to the left disk, and no difference between moving and static conditions.

In summary, the AM simulation replicated the primary findings of Behrmann and Tipper (1994; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996): (a) For individuals with no brain damage, no reliable differences were obtained across conditions; (b) for patients shown connected disks, left-sided facilitation and right-sided inhibition were obtained in the moving condition relative to the static; (c) for patients shown disconnected disks, left-sided facilitation and right-sided inhibition were not observed; and (d) for patients, there was a main effect of target side—left was slower than right.

The model's ability to replicate the pattern of data was not obvious without running a simulation, and in fact, its behavior for disconnected disks was unexpected. Nonetheless, the results emerged reliably from the simulation. In a situation such as this, the only recourse is to experiment with the model and determine what factors influence its behavior, with the goal of eventually extracting an intuitive explanation for its success.

Many factors did not affect the model's qualitative performance, suggesting that the result is robust. The specific design of the stimuli was unimportant; qualitative performance was robust to the shape of the disks, the pattern of exogenous input corresponding to the disks, or the size of the disks relative to the thickness of the bar (see Figure 12). The connectedness of the two disks was not even essential to achieve the reversal effect (see the lower-right panel of Figure 12), an observation to which I return shortly. The model was robust to other factors, including alternative parameters for the transmission-probability curve (see Figure 7) as long as a gradient was present, the rate of rotation of the stimulus, and the readout formula. In fact, the reversal effect reported for rotating connected disks could be made even larger by increasing the size of the disks, reinforcing the exogenous input to the borders of the stimulus, increasing the rotation time, and/or reading out the asymptotic activity of the AM.

One factor that necessarily influences the model's qualitative performance is the strength of exogenous input corresponding to the bar. If the bar triggers a very weak exogenous input—for example, when the input corresponding to the bar is 1 pixel thick and those pixels are attenuated in strength relative to pixels of the disks—the exogenous input pattern for connected disks becomes quite like the pattern for disconnected disks, and the model treats the connected-disk condition like the disconnected-disk condition. What this circumstance corresponds to in terms of visual stimuli is unclear, because the exogenous input to the AM reflects the net activity of feature detectors, not raw pixels in the image. Even a thin, faint line in the image could trigger significant activity of edge detectors, resulting in a substantial exogenous input to the AM. (Indeed, because cells in visual cortex respond more strongly to edges than to solid regions, there is no reason to believe that bar thickness has a significant effect on the pattern of neural activity.)

To understand the simulation results, consider first the moving connected-disk trials. The model appears to track the right disk into the left field. Because attentional activity in the model corre-




Figure 11. One trial of the lesioned model on the Tipper and Behrmann (1996) rotating disconnected disks.




Figure 12. Exogenous input activity patterns for eight different barbell stimuli. Rotation of all eight versions achieved a reversal of neglect, suggesting that the model is robust to the exact shape of the barbell. The pattern in the upper left panel is the one used for all simulations reported in this article and corresponds most closely to the experimental stimuli used in neuropsychological studies in terms of the size of the disks relative to the length of the bar.

sponds to covert attention,⁵ this tracking is not necessarily overt and is therefore consistent with the finding of Tipper and Behrmann (1996) that eye movements are not critical to the phenomenon. Tracking occurs because the attentional state has hysteresis (e.g., Sperling, 1970): The state at some iteration is a function of both the exogenous input and the state at the previous iteration. Attention would not ordinarily be drawn to a disk on the left given a competing disk on the right because the exogenous input to the left disk is weaker. Nonetheless, if attention is already focused on the disk on the left, even a weak exogenous input may be sufficient to maintain attention on the disk. In terms of the rules of activation of the model described earlier, the disk that has moved into the left field has support by means of the bias and cooperation rules, whereas the disk that has moved into the right field has support only by means of the bias rule.

However, the winner is not determined simply by the fact that one disk has the support of the cooperation rule and the other does not. Key to the model's behavior is the total quantitative support provided to each of the disks. If the total support is greater for the right disk, then attention will flip to the right. This flipping occurs on disconnected-disk trials. In the model, connectedness per se is not critical to the flipping of attention: Attention does not flip for a display in which the bar is broken in the center (see Figure 12, lower-right panel), which disrupts connectedness. Instead, the "neck" of the barbell—the region where the disk makes contact with the bar—seems to be the critical component. The neck provides a region of exogenous input adjacent to the disk and, by the cooperation rule, therefore provides a neighborhood that supports attentional activity. Figure 10 clearly shows that activation is centered on the neck as the disk rotates into the left field. Without the neck to "hook" activity in place, activity drops to the point that the left disk cannot fend off attack from the right disk. Although this account is not entirely satisfactory, in that I have not explained

the phenomena in linguistically simple, qualitative terms, it is sometimes the best one can hope for in characterizing the behavior of a complex, dynamical system such as the AM. The explanation I have given for the AM's performance leads to empirical predictions, in particular concerning a stimulus display such as that in the lower right panel of Figure 12. I return to the issue of predictions of the model in the Discussion section.

The Behrmann and Tipper (1994; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996) data seem strongly consistent with the hypothesis that neglect operates in object-based coordinates. The AM, however, provides an alternative explanation, because it has no object-based frame of reference, yet it can account for the data. The AM's account involves covert attentional tracking. Without simulations, the covert-tracking account is not compelling, because it would not appear to explain the lack of neglect reversal for disconnected displays. However, despite the absence of object-based representations, the AM does show a distinction between connected (single object) and disconnected (multiple object) displays and hence increases the plausibility of the covert-tracking account.

Behrmann and Tipper (1999)

Recently, Behrmann and Tipper (1999) explored an intriguing variation of the rotating-barbell experiment in which the display also contained two elements—squares—that remained stationary during the trial (see Figure 13). Subjects were asked to detect a target that could appear either on one of the disks or on one of the squares. As in the earlier studies, facilitation was observed for

⁵ Attentional activity corresponds to covert attention by virtue of the fact that eye movements are not modeled, and the stimuli do not change position in the visual field as attention shifts.




Figure 13. The multiple-object display studied by Behrmann and Tipper (1999). In the moving condition, the initial display (a) consists of two stationary squares and a barbell, which—as in the earlier studies—rotates such that its two disks exchange horizontal positions (b). Participants were asked to detect a target that could appear on either disk or either square. In the static condition, no rotation occurred (b).

targets appearing on the left (blue) disk in the moving condition relative to the static condition, and inhibition was observed for targets appearing on the right (red) disk, consistent with neglect in the object-based frame of the barbell. Simultaneously, however, neglect was observed in the viewer-based frame for the squares: Target detection in the left square was slower than in the right square. The finding of neglect in both viewer- and object-based reference frames suggests that attention can select and access information encoded with respect to multiple reference frames.

To simulate this experiment, I made several changes to the previous simulation. First, the barbell rotated from 30° to 150° , instead of 0° to 180° . Maintaining the same rotation rate as in the previous simulation, the rotation took 267 iterations. Second, stationary squares were added to the display. Third, readout activity was calculated at the square locations as well as the disk locations. Figure 14 presents a single trial of the lesioned AM. The model's behavior is somewhat surprising: Initially, attention is drawn to the right side of the display, which includes the right disk and right square. As the barbell begins to rotate, attention is stretched to span the disk and the square, but when the disk and square separate, the attentional blob connecting them is broken into two blobs. One might expect the smaller blob to be suppressed because of competition between the blobs, but the competition is weak, for

the following reason. The competition rule causes a location to be inhibited to the extent that its activity is below the average activity of all active locations. Because locations in both blobs have comparable activity—in fact, they are near asymptote at the point when the blobs split—neither blob is significantly inhibited.

Quantitative measures of readout activity (see Table 2) are consistent with the example presented in Figure 14 and with the results of Behrmann and Tipper (1999). Facilitation—increased activity at the disk location—is observed for the left disk in the moving relative to the static condition. Inhibition—decreased activity at the disk location—is observed for the right disk. And in both moving and static conditions, facilitation is observed for the right square relative to the left. Thus, the AM can account for what appears to be neglect occurring simultaneously in multiple reference frames, although it encodes visual information in only a single reference frame, viewer based.

In the experiment just described, the target appeared on the squares half the time and on the disks half the time. In a second experiment, Behrmann and Tipper (1999) varied the target contingencies, such that for some subjects, 80% of targets were on the squares, and for other subjects, 80% of the targets were on the disks. They observed an accentuation of neglect for the shapes—disks or squares—that were probed more frequently and interpreted this in terms of task demands' modulating attention, and hence neglect, within location-based or object-based reference frames.

These results can also be accommodated within the framework of the AM. Suppose that the target contingencies modulate the AM's likelihood of attending the squares: The more frequently targets appear on the squares, the more likely locations of the squares are to draw attention. Because features are transmitted to the AM in an all-or-none fashion, a sensible way of increasing or decreasing the likelihood of attention is to modulate the transmission probability of features of the squares, much the same effect that I hypothesize neglect has. In the target-more-likely-on-squares condition, the transmission probability of features at the locations of the squares is multiplied by 1.2; in the target-more-likely-on-disks condition, the transmission probability of features at the




Figure 14. One trial of the lesioned model on the Behrmann and Tipper (1999) barbell–square experiment.

locations of the squares is multiplied by 0.8.⁶ Thus, neglect and target contingencies affect transmission probabilities independently. Results for these two conditions, shown in Table 3, clearly indicate that object-based neglect of the disks is accentuated when the target is more likely to appear on the disks, and location-based neglect of the squares is accentuated when the target is more likely to appear on the squares. Again, the AM suggests that the findings of Behrmann and Tipper (1999) can be accounted for without invoking object-based reference frames.

Although the AM replicated the pattern of data of Behrmann and Tipper (1999), the account is intuitively unsatisfying in one regard. As Figure 14 shows, the AM's initial blob of activation encompasses both the right disk and the right square. The activation rules giving rise to this blob depend on the spatial proximity of the two shapes but ignore the fact that the two shapes are distinct objects. One might view this failure to prevent the spread of activation across object boundaries as a deficiency of the AM. A simple repair might be made by increasing the resolution of the topographic map, resulting in additional locations separating the two objects and less likelihood of activation spreading from one object to the other. However, the problem seems more fundamental: The AM has no embodiment of gestalt grouping principles such as good continuation, closure, or similarity, but only the principle of proximity. Such principles can account for object-based effects in undamaged individuals without requiring object-based representations (e.g., Behrmann, Zemel, & Mozer, 1998; Mozer, 1999; Mozer, Zemel, Behrmann, & Williams, 1992; Vecera & Farah, 1994). The AM might incorporate grouping principles by using the grouping principles to specify which pairs of units cooperate and compete (Grossberg, Mingolla, & Ross, 1994; Mozer & Sitton, 1998). For example, the current implementation of the AM incorporates the principle of proximity via mutual excitation between adjacent units in the topographic map. The AM might be extended to include cooperation, say, between two locations containing the same features or between two locations whose features form a smooth contour. Essentially, I am proposing to modulate the connectivity within the AM based on how features in the display are grouped according to the gestalt principles.

I digressed in order to explain how the AM might be made more sensitive to object boundaries. Assuming such a modification, the AM is still able to explain the Behrmann and Tipper (1999) results. The modified AM, when lesioned, should select either the right side of the barbell or the right square. If the barbell is selected, covert attentional tracking should still lead to object-based neglect for the barbell. If the right square is selected, viewer-based neglect will be obtained for the squares. The magnitude of object-based and viewer-based effects will depend on how often one object or the other is selected, which in turn should be influenced by target contingencies.

Table 2
Readout Activity From the Lesioned Attentional Mechanism for the Experiment of Behrmann and Tipper (1999)

Condition	Disk		Square	
	Left	Right	Left	Right
Moving	.21	.04	.00	.99
Static	.00	.90	.00	.91

Table 3
Readout Activity From the Lesioned Attentional Mechanism for the Experiment of Behrmann and Tipper (1999) Under Different Target Contingencies

Condition	Disk		Square	
	Left	Right	Left	Right
Target more likely on disks				
Moving	.21	.02	.00	.78
Static	.00	.91	.00	.73
Target more likely on squares				
Moving	.16	.04	.00	.99
Static	.00	.72	.00	.92

In summary, the AM—whether in its present form or modified to incorporate gestalt grouping principles—is able to explain the simultaneous observation of object-based and location-based effects of neglect in the experimental paradigm studied by Behrmann and Tipper (1999).

Pavlovskaya et al. (1997)

If object recognition requires that the visual input be encoded in object-based coordinates, one might expect recognition accuracy to be impacted if the object-based frame is imposed incorrectly. Pavlovskaya et al. (1997) studied a task that might seem to affect the establishment of an object-based frame. They supposed that the *luminance centroid* (LC) of a visual shape—the center of mass of its light distribution—serves as a natural origin for an object-based frame. They further supposed that a cue prior to the onset of the shape might serve to bias or shift the origin, which would hamper recognition. Stimuli were brief, masked, letterlike stimuli preceded by a location cue. The cue could be at the LC or to its left or right (see Figure 15). Subjects were instructed to report the stimulus identity. Subjects with no brain damage performed best if the cue was at the LC (see Figure 16, upper-left graph), consistent with the hypothesized role of the cue in biasing the establishment of an object-based frame. The neglect data (see Figure 16, upper-right graph) were also consistent with the hypothesis: One might suppose that neglect causes a rightward bias in specifying the origin, thereby impeding recognition, but that a left cue offsets this bias.

However, the data do not demand an explanation involving object-based frames or an effect of cues and neglect in establishing an object-based frame. Figure 16 (bottom row) shows a simulation of this experiment using the AM. In the simulation, the cue was

⁶ As mentioned earlier, the AM receives not only exogenous input from the visual field but also endogenous input from higher brain centers. The endogenous input allows the AM to be guided in a task-dependent manner. Adapting to target contingencies is exactly the sort of guidance that higher centers could provide. In this experiment, because subjects fixated at the center of the display at the onset of each trial, object locations map to retinal locations, and top-down guidance can be provided by specifying likely retinal locations where targets would appear. In the case of displays that had more variability, it is conceivable that cognitive processing could map task constraints into biases on retinal locations via simple visual routines (Ullman, 1984).

presented for 50 iterations, followed by the stimulus for 20 iterations. Stimuli tested consisted of 100 trials of each of four different shapes studied by Pavlovskaya et al. (1997)—an H, a left-pointing T, a right-pointing T, and a horizontal bar. Over the 20 stimulus iterations, the mean attentional activity of locations corresponding to the stimulus was computed. I assume that recognition accuracy is related to the attentional activity that accumulates while the stimulus is present. The attentional activity was computed by first calculating the mean activity of stimulus locations in each column and then calculating the mean across columns. This measure gave a better sense of how far the attentional activation had spread in a left–right direction than a direct average across locations. However, both measures yielded the same results.

The simulation showed the same qualitative pattern of performance as that of the human subjects.⁷ For the normal model, activation of the stimulus following an LC cue was greater than that following a left or right cue: LC versus left, $F(1, 396) = 23.2, p < .001$, and LC versus right, $F(1, 396) = 23.2, p < .001$; however, left and right cues obtained the same activation, $F(1, 396) < 1$; for the lesioned model, activation of the stimulus following an LC cue was less than that when following a left cue, $F(1, 396) = 1,758, p < .001$, and was greater than that when following a right cue, $F(1, 396) = 4,098, p < .001$. One gains an intuition about these results when examining typical activation patterns for the unlesioned and lesioned model, with both left and LC cues (see Figure 17). When a cue is first presented, the cue location becomes active. To a first approximation, when the shape appears, activation spills out from the cue location to the remaining locations of the shape. The “spilling” is due to the cooperation rule: A location becomes activated more readily if its neighbors are already active. For the unlesioned model, when the cue is at the center of locations to cover to the cue’s left and right, allowing for an efficient parallel propagation of activation. When the cue is to the left or right, however, activation has further to travel before it reaches the shape’s extremities. This asymmetry results in less attentional activation for left and right cues than for the LC cue.

For the lesioned model, a different asymmetry comes into play: To a degree, attentional activation must spread from the cue location to other locations of the object (the cooperation rule), but the weaker exogenous input to the left of the cue causes the activation to travel more readily to the right than to the left. Cuing to the left appears to partly compensate for this asymmetry, resulting in the most rapid rise of activation for left cues.

Cuing effects arise in the simulation not because of interference or facilitation in constructing an object-based representation but because of attentional dynamics in a viewer-based frame. Driver




Figure 15. Sample shape used in Pavlovskaya et al. (1997) and the locations of the three different cue types.




Figure 16. Human (top panels) and simulation (bottom panels) data from the Pavlovskaya et al. (1997) study, both for individuals with and without neglect. The human and simulation data show an excellent qualitative match. The error bars for the simulation indicate one standard error of the mean. LC = luminance centroid; AM = attentional mechanism.

and Pouget (2000) also argued that the Pavlovskaya et al. (1997) data can be explained without recourse to object-based frames. Their argument is completely consistent with the AM’s account, although the AM adds to the story by providing a working computational mechanism that removes all doubt about the plausibility of the explanation, by modeling normal as well as patient performance and by avoiding assumptions specific to the Pavlovskaya et al. paradigm (e.g., one of Driver & Pouget’s accounts assumes that accuracy is dependent on the balance of neural response over left and right sides of a stimulus).

Arguin and Bub (1993)

Several studies have been conducted to try to disentangle the contributions of various frames of reference to neglect by manipulating the location of a target in one reference frame while keeping it fixed in another (e.g., Behrmann & Moscovitch, 1994; Calvanio, Petrone, & Levine, 1987; Farah, Brunn, Wong, Wallace, & Carpenter, 1990). Arguin and Bub (1993) performed such a study in which the

⁷ Although Figure 16 does not appear to show a precise quantitative fit to the data, one should not be concerned. First, the mapping from attentional activation to recognition accuracy need not be linear. If the mapping curve has a positive acceleration, small differences for higher mean activities will be amplified and the fit will improve. Second, little or no attempt was made to adjust the stimulus representation and timing of a trial to achieve an exact fit.




Figure 17. Typical activation patterns on trials of the normal and lesioned model, with luminance centroid (LC) and left cues.

two frames were viewer based and object based.⁸ Subjects were asked to name a target letter presented in a horizontal array containing four elements. The other three elements were filled circles. The target could appear in one of eight positions on the screen, called the *viewer-relative position*. The target could also appear in one of four positions relative to the circles, called the *object-relative position*. Viewer-relative and object-relative positions were varied independently, producing 32 different display configurations (see Figure 18).




Figure 18. Each rectangle, containing a letter and three filled circles, depicts a possible stimulus display in the Arguin and Bub (1993) study. The fixation point is indicated by the plus sign. In the top two and the middle rectangles, the position of the letter is varied with respect to the viewer-based frame, whereas the position is fixed with respect to the object-based frame. In the middle and the bottom two rectangles, the position of the letter is varied with respect to the object-based frame, whereas the position is fixed with respect to the viewer-based frame.

Response time to name the target was measured. Arguin and Bub viewed response time as a “direct measure of allocation of attention across space” (p. 350): The more attention allocated to a position, the faster the response time. This paradigm allows for the comparison of performance across object-relative position when the viewer-relative position is held constant.

Whereas subjects with no brain damage showed no effect of object-relative position, patient B.A., with neglect, showed in-

⁸ Arguin and Bub (1993) distinguished object-based frames from *stimulus-based* frames. An object-based frame “depicts the spatial relations between the parts of a single object,” whereas a stimulus-based frame “represents the relative locations of spatially distinct stimuli” (Arguin & Bub, 1993, p. 350). I see no clear-cut distinction between these two situations. Many objects can be drawn in a way that their parts are not physically connected (e.g., the word DOG). If one accepts a hierarchical organization of objects and their parts, there is in principle no distinction between *objects* and *stimuli* because a *stimulus* at one level of the hierarchy (made up of multiple objects) is an object at the next level up the hierarchy. Until some compelling evidence is presented for a dissociation of *object-based* and *stimulus-based* frames of reference, I argue the two terms should be treated as equivalent. Even if the two frames are dissociated, the simulation to be reported is still of value: Arguin and Bub argued for the psychological reality of stimulus-based frames based on their data, but the present simulation replicates the pattern of data without either a stimulus-based or an object-based level of representation.

creasing response time with leftward target displacement in the array. Because an effect of object-relative position was obtained when unconfounded with viewer-relative position, the data were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that neglect can occur with respect to an object-based frame of reference.

In my simulation of this experiment, each display element was mapped to a 4×3 pattern of exogenous input to the AM, with a one-column gap between display elements. Because the target could appear in eight different viewer-centered locations, and it was necessary to allow for three additional display elements to the left and right of the target, the topographic map was designed to accommodate 14 distinct locations. Figure 19 shows an example of the lesioned model's performance. As the figure illustrates, the exogenous input tends to be weaker for the elements further to the left. However, because the stimulus display is on the left side of the viewer-centered frame, the exogenous input is degraded even for the rightmost element. Although all four elements capture attention on this trial, attention builds most rapidly for the rightmost elements, suggesting that the readout activity (the mean attentional activity over the 20 iterations following stimulus onset) should be larger for the rightmost elements and, hence, response time should be faster. This observation was confirmed by running 14 presentations of the complete experimental design (32 trial types).

The simulation data are summarized in Figure 20. For the unlesioned model, no effect was found for either object- or viewer-relative position: object, $F(3, 416) < 1$; viewer, $F(7, 416) = 1.1$, $p > .3$. For the lesioned model, however, main effects were obtained for both object- and viewer-relative position: object, $F(3, 416) = 80.8$, $p < .001$; viewer, $F(7, 416) = 109.9$, $p < .001$, and there was no interaction, $F(21, 416) = 1.14$, $p > .3$. These results replicated the main findings of Arguin and Bub (1993). The only significant discrepancy between the human and simulation data is

that Arguin and Bub observed effects of retinal eccentricity that influenced performance as a function of viewer-relative position. The model obviously does not address retinal acuity effects, because its visual field is homogeneous. However, such effects could readily be incorporated by, for example, assuming readout time that increases with distance from fixation.

How can it be that the model has only a viewer-based representation, yet its performance is affected by the object-relative position of a target? The story depends on two factors. First, the attentional gradient causes exogenous input from the relative left of a stimulus to be weaker than exogenous input from the relative right (the bias rule), regardless of the absolute position of the stimulus. Second, attentional activation initially depends on the strength of the exogenous input, but then competition comes into play and the relatively stronger locations suppress the relatively weaker locations. Suppression of the leftmost elements by the rightmost elements was also evident in the Behrmann and Tipper (1994) simulation (see Figure 10), where only the right half of the barbell was attended, even prior to the onset of rotation. The suppression does not occur in the normal model because the exogenous input to the left and right elements is balanced; consequently, their support is roughly equal, and competition does not come into play.

Central to this account is the fact that competition arises only from active locations, making the key consideration in the determination of the activation of an attentional unit its viewer-based horizontal location with respect to other locations where features are present, not its location with respect to the retina as a whole. The idea of relative neglect arising from an attentional gradient has been proposed previously (e.g., Driver, 1999; Kinsbourne, 1993; Pouget & Sejnowski, 1997). However, the AM explains how this idea, in the context of a dynamical system, can give rise to the detailed properties of patient performance.




Figure 19. Performance of the (a) unlesioned and (b) lesioned model when presented with a sample display from the Arguin and Bub (1993) study.




Figure 20. Simulation performance of the unlesioned and lesioned attentional mechanism (AM) on the Arguin and Bub (1993) task. The error bars indicate one standard error of the mean.

Mozer and Behrmann (1992) modeled effects of object-relative position in a reading task with the lesioned AM similar to those found in the present simulation. However, the effect of viewer-relative position on performance is somewhat dependent on the task and the specific readout assumptions. For example, when Mozer et al. (1997) simulated line bisection using the lesioned AM, they found only weak viewer-relative effects when response formulation was assumed to depend on the asymptotic activity of the AM.

Driver and Halligan (1991)

Like Arguin and Bub (1993), Driver and Halligan (1991) studied a task that involved independently manipulating the location of a target in viewer-based and object-based frames. The task involved detecting whether a pair of nonsense shapes differed in a subtle detail. A sample shape is shown in Figure 21a. The shapes were vertically elongated and relatively bottom heavy, two cues that would suggest an unequivocal principal (up-down) axis. When presented upright and aligned with the patient's sagittal midline, the viewer-centered and object-centered frames are confounded. However, when the shapes are presented at an orientation of 45°, the two frames can be dissociated. In Figure 21b, the detail labeled *L* appears on the object left but the viewer right, and the

detail labeled *R* appears on the object right but the viewer left. Driver and Halligan observed an object-based effect: Details on the left side of a shape were more often neglected than details on the right side, regardless of whether the detail appeared to the left or right of the sagittal midline, suggesting that neglect can operate in coordinates defined relative to the principal axis of a shape.

The critical trials of the Driver and Halligan (1991) experiment were those in which the pair of nonsense shapes differed in some detail. Eight shapes were used to form these displays. Each shape was used in one upright and one diagonally oriented display, and in mirror images of these displays, resulting in a total of 32 critical trials.

My simulation used the same eight shapes and 32 critical trials. For each trial, I presented a single shape, with the detail present. The shapes drawn by Driver and Halligan (1991) were composed on a 10×5 grid, and each grid cell was translated to a 2×2 region of activity on the topographic map. The activity pattern for the shape in Figure 21a is shown in Figure 22a; activity is enhanced around the contour of the shape as in all other simulations. To generate the shapes at a diagonal orientation, I designed an activity pattern for the upright shape and then rotated it on the grid 45° clockwise or counterclockwise using the same algorithm as the rotation of the barbell in the Behrmann and Tipper (1994) simulation. (The rotation was a mathematical operation to map pixels in




Figure 21. Example of an elongated nonsense shape used by Driver and Halligan (1991). (a) When the shape is presented upright, the viewer-based and object-based frames are in alignment. (b) At an orientation of 45°, the frames are dissociated. The detail labeled *L* appears on the object left but the viewer right. The detail labeled *R* appears on the object right but the viewer left. (c) At the other diagonal orientation, the two frames are again in alignment as in (a). From "Can Visual Neglect Operate in Object-Centered Coordinates? An Affirmative Single-Case Study," by J. Driver and P. W. Halligan, 1991, *Cognitive Neuropsychology*, 8, p. 481, Figure 2. Copyright 1991 by Psychology Press. Adapted by permission of Psychology Press, Ltd., Hove, UK.




Figure 22. (a) Exogenous input to the unlesioned model for an upright Driver and Halligan (1991) nonsense shape (see Figure 21a). (b) Exogenous input to the lesioned model for a rotated Driver and Halligan nonsense shape (see Figure 21b). (c) Asymptotic attentional mechanism state for the rotated Driver and Halligan nonsense shape.

the upright shape to pixels in the diagonal shape. It was not part of the simulation; that is, the model was presented with a static stimulus at a diagonal orientation; it did not view the stimulus as it was rotated into position.) Sample exogenous input to the lesioned model for the shape in Figure 21b is presented in Figure 22b. The AM was allowed to settle for 100 iterations, and then the readout activity was determined at the locations corresponding to the detail. I assume that readout activity is monotonically related to the likelihood of noticing the detail. Figure 22c depicts the final state of the lesioned AM. Although the difference is not completely apparent in the figure, the readout activity of details *L* and *R* on this trial was .48 and .79, respectively.

The critical trials fall into four conditions, determined by crossing the side of the shape on which the detail appears with the side of the viewer on which the detail appears. In the Driver and Halligan (1991) experiment, the two conditions in which the detail appeared on the same side of the two reference frames were studied using upright shapes (e.g., Figure 21a). I chose instead to use shapes oriented at 45° from upright in either a clockwise or counterclockwise direction such that the relevant detail appeared on the same side of both the viewer-based and object-based frames (e.g., Figure 21c). I made this decision after observing that the unlesioned model produced significantly higher readout activity for upright shapes than for diagonal shapes, because of the coarse resolution of the topographic map and quantization effects in the diagonal displays. The stimulus in Figure 21c allows one to test the same conditions as the stimulus in Figure 21a but is a better matched control to the stimulus in Figure 21b.

The simulation involved 10 replications of each critical trial. An analysis of variance performed using the stimulus as the random factor revealed a main effect of object-relative position (object-left details had a readout activity value of .57; object-right details had a readout activity value of .67), $F(1, 7) = 6.07, p < .05$, and a main effect of viewer-relative position (viewer-left details had a readout activity value of .43; viewer-right details had a readout activity value of .80), $F(1, 7) = 51.00, p < .001$, but the interaction did not reach significance, $F(1, 7) = 1.6, p = .24$. Most important, regardless of whether the detail appeared on the left or the right with respect to the viewer-based frame, the readout activity was higher for details on the right side of the shape than on the left side of the shape. Thus, the model replicated the key finding from the patient data.

The simulation and the patient data did not match in that viewer position had the larger effect in the simulation, whereas object

position had the larger effect in the patient data. However, the human data was from a single patient, and the simulation data assumed a specific lesion. One should therefore not expect an exact match between the simulation and the patient, just as one would not expect an exact match between the data from two different patients. Nonetheless, the model did replicate the key result that suggested to Driver and Halligan (1991) the role of object-based reference frames.⁹

Driver et al. (1994) explained how effects of within-object position could arise from viewer-based frames of reference. I summarize their explanation, because it serves as a helpful lead-in to the explanation suggested by the AM. If one traces a horizontal path in the viewer-based frame intersecting detail *L* in Figure 21b, detail *L* always appears to the left of other shape information along this path and, similarly, detail *R* always appears to the right of other shape information along a horizontal path intersecting it. Thus, the viewer-based and object-based frames have not been completely unconfounded, and the advantage for detail *R* over detail *L* could be explained by neglect for information that appears on the relative left in the viewer-based frame—that is, information whose viewer-based horizontal position is on the left relative to other information with the same viewer-based vertical position. The AM suggested essentially this relative neglect explanation for the Arguin and Bub (1993) data. Although the AM does not use competition between left and right along a horizontal path—competition in the AM is global, that is, between every pair of locations—the simple account was adequate because the Arguin and Bub stimuli extended primarily in the horizontal direction. However, the explanation requires some elaboration for the Driver and Halligan (1991) stimuli, which extend nonuniformly in the vertical direction and therefore cannot be treated as a one-dimensional shape. The explanation for the Driver and Halligan stimuli is based on the observation that along every horizontal path, the strength of exogenous input to the AM on the right is stronger than on the left. Although competition is global, cooperation is local; the features along the right edge of the shape are neighbors and hence are mutually supportive as are the features on the left. A gang effect emerges whereby the stronger features on the right edge support one another and hence—because of competition—become even stronger.

Although relative neglect may qualitatively characterize the phenomena observed in the Arguin and Bub (1993) and the Driver and Halligan (1991) data, the AM offers a deeper explanation with greater predictive power. Relative neglect arises in the AM due to an interaction between the competition and cooperation rules and the specific pattern of exogenous input provided by the bias rule. It is even conceivable that for some configurations of visual features in a display, the balance of competition and cooperation

⁹ The larger effect of viewer position in the model is responsible for another discrepancy between the model and patient performance: The patient made fewer errors when the detail was object-right/viewer-left than when the detail was object-left/viewer-right (14 vs. 23 errors on 32 trials, respectively). However, the importance of this comparison is questionable, for the reasons explained in the text, and because Driver and Halligan (1991) did not report the statistical significance of the comparison. Rather, they reported only chi-square tests for the main effects of viewer position and object position, and their significance results matched those of the model.

may be such that relative neglect is minimized or suppressed. Thus, the AM suggests that the pattern of neglect will depend not simply on the count of features to the left or right of some location but also on the arrangement of features. Such effects have been observed even for simple bisection tasks (Halligan & Marshall, 1994) and serve to explain the next two experimental results.

Driver et al. (1994)

Because neglect of the relative left in the viewer-based frame could explain the results of Driver and Halligan (1991) as well as Arguin and Bub (1993), Driver et al. (1994) explored a task that in addition controlled for the relative horizontal position of the critical information, ruling out relative position as a complete explanation for the object-based neglect they observed. They presented an array of equilateral triangles, and the patient's task was to detect a gap in the center triangle. Two different configurations were studied; in one, the edge in which the gap appeared—the *critical edge*—was to the left of midline with respect to the reference frame established by the array (see Figure 23a; the *left condition*), and in the other, the critical edge was to the right of midline (see Figure 23b; the *right condition*). In the two conditions, the absolute and relative horizontal viewer-based position of the critical edge was identical. The difference between the two conditions can be described only with respect to the principal axes of the array.

The simulation of this experiment involved presenting each of the arrays 200 times to the lesioned AM and measuring the mean activity of locations corresponding to the critical edge over the first 20 iterations of a trial. Because it was difficult to construct equilateral triangles given the limited resolution of the AM, the simulated configurations were tilted slightly, from 60° to 45°, but this modification did not alter the essential features of the arrays. Figure 24a shows the exogenous input for the AM for the left condition; one can readily see the seven triangles.

The readout activity of the critical edge in the left and right conditions for the lesioned model was .52 and .66, respectively, a statistically reliable difference, $F(1, 199) = 466, p < .001$. Thus, the AM showed more neglect for the left condition than the right—just as the patients did—despite the fact that the critical edge was in the same absolute and relative viewer-based position




Figure 23. Stimuli studied by Driver et al. (1994). The asterisk indicates the edge on which a gap was to be detected. When the critical edge is characterized with respect to the principal axis of the object, it is to the left of the center in (a) but to the right of the center in (b). Adapted from “Egocentric and Object-Based Visual Neglect,” by J. Driver. In *The Hippocampal and Parietal Foundations of Spatial Cognition* (p. 82, Figure 4.7), by N. Burgess, K. J. Jeffery, and J. O’Keefe (Eds.), 1999, New York: Oxford University Press. © Royal Society, 1999. Adapted by permission of Oxford University Press.




Figure 24. Simulation of the Driver et al. (1994) task of detecting a gap in the center triangle. (a) Exogenous input for the unlesioned model in the left condition. (b) State of the lesioned attentional mechanism (AM) at Iteration 20 in a typical trial of the left condition. (c) State of the lesioned AM at Iteration 20 in a typical trial of the right condition. In (b) and (c), the gray arrows point to the triangle edge in which the gap appears. The critical locations are less active in the left condition than in the right condition.

in the two conditions, and it had the same number of features to its left and right in the two conditions. The second and third panels of Figure 24 present typical AM states on the final iteration for the left and right conditions, respectively. The critical edge—pointed to by the gray arrow—had less activation for the left condition than for the right.

Observing the AM in operation, one gains an insight as to its behavior. Initially, activity begins to grow around the entire set of triangles. However, the activity of the left-most triangles rises at a slower rate, their exogenous input being the weakest, and their activity is quickly suppressed by the competition from the right-most triangles (the competition principle). Roughly, one can conceive of the three right-most triangles as the “strong locations” and the three left-most triangles as the “weak locations.” The critical edge is closer to the strong locations in the right condition than the left condition; one can readily see this fact in Figure 23. Because of the cooperation principle, which causes the spread of activity to neighboring locations, activation is likely to spill from the strong locations to the critical edge in the right condition, but this is less likely to occur, because of the increased distance, in the left condition.

Driver et al. (1994) suggested that neglect must operate with respect to the principal axes of the array, although they acknowledged that axis-based neglect might result from an interaction between object-based and viewer-based factors. This account requires that the principal axes be identified, which is tantamount to establishing the object-based frame of reference. The AM can replicate axis-based neglect yet has no explicit representation of the axes or object-based frame.

Driver and Baylis (1999)

Driver (1999) briefly described a follow-up to the equilateral-triangle experiment that is troublesome because the explanation I gave for the AM’s behavior in the equilateral-triangle experiment fails to predict the outcome of the follow-up study. Although the follow-up study by Driver and Baylis is unpublished at present, it seems sufficiently important to the line of argument presented in this article that I attempted a simulation.

As in the equilateral-triangle experiment, the task involved detecting a gap in a center triangle. In this experiment, the triangle

was embedded in a context of isosceles triangles (see Figure 25a). Symmetry and elongation of the display configuration suggested a principal axis, indicated in the figure by a dashed line. In the *left* condition, the configuration of triangles was such that the critical edge was left of the principal axis; in the *right* condition, the critical edge was right of the principal axis. If neglect occurs with respect to a reference frame in which the principal axis divides the object into left and right sides, one would expect patient performance in the left condition to be worse than in the right condition. This is indeed what Driver and Baylis found (no quantitative results were reported).

Examination of the figure suggests that the AM would predict exactly the opposite result. In the left condition, the equilateral triangle closer to the critical edge was on the right; in the right condition, the equilateral triangle closer to the critical edge was on the left. By the account I gave for the equilateral-triangle experiment, the adjacent triangle should provide support that spills over to the critical edge, and because the equilateral triangle on the left should provide less support than the equilateral triangle on the right, performance should be better in the left condition than in the right.

My simulation consisted of a 45×45 retinotopic array designed such that the shortest distance from a point on the isosceles triangle to a point on the equilateral triangle was the same for both isosceles triangles and in both conditions. As in the simulation of the Driver and Halligan (1991) data, I designed upright triangles and then rotated them on the grid to achieve the diagonal orientations. (The rotation was a mathematical operation to map pixels in the upright orientation to pixels in the diagonal orientation; it was not part of the simulation.) The larger array was necessary to achieve the necessary symmetries given quantization effects due to finite resolution of the array.

The simulation of this experiment involved presenting each of the arrays 200 times to the lesioned AM and measuring the mean activity of locations corresponding to the critical edge over the first 20 iterations of a trial. The mean activity was reliably different in the left and right conditions, .719 and .742, respectively, $F(1, 199) = 182, p < .001$. Sample simulation trials are shown in Figure 26. This result is in accord with the human patient data and is astonishing because I expected the opposite effect based on the argument presented earlier. To verify that the result was not due to an artifact in the stimuli, I simulated the unlesioned AM and

verified that performance was the same in left and right conditions. To better understand the difference between the left and right conditions, I superimposed the two stimuli such that the equilateral triangles in the two conditions were overlaid on one another (see Figure 25b). One curious difference is that, because the isosceles triangles were placed the same distance from the equilateral triangle in each condition, the two stimuli had different horizontal extents: The two isosceles triangles were offset to the viewer left in the right condition relative to the left condition. This offset can be seen in the figure by comparing the dashed lines indicating the left and right extent of the isosceles triangles. The consequence of this offset was that the exogenous input to the two isosceles triangles was weaker in the right condition than in the left and, hence, could result in less competition with the critical edge. This explanation is probably not the whole story, because even if the offset were eliminated, a crucial factor distinguished the stimuli in the two conditions: the horizontal distribution of locations occupied by visual features. If one examines the superimposed image in Figure 25b, it can be seen that the two isosceles triangles on the viewer left of the center triangle are mirror reversed along the horizontal axis. Consequently, in the left condition the tip of the isosceles triangle was further to the viewer right and the base was further to the viewer left. Because the isosceles triangles had nonhomogeneities—for example, the density and mass of features near the tip were greater than near the base—one should expect the distribution of features in the triangles, when modulated by the gradient of attention, to influence competition in the model.¹⁰

The two factors distinguishing left and right conditions that I identified both contributed to the activation of the locations of the two isosceles triangles being lower in the right condition than in the left: .51 and .75 for the two isosceles triangles in the right condition versus .60 and .77 in the left. Less activation of the isosceles triangles means less competition for the equilateral triangle and more activation of the critical edge. If weaker competition was the cause of the higher activation in the right condition, then the proximity of the isosceles triangles to the equilateral triangle should not matter, because the offset will be present for any fixed separation of the triangles, and inhibition in the model is global and does not depend on local configurations of features. Indeed, in displays with greater space between triangles, the right condition still results in more activation than the left, consistent with my hypothesized explanation.

My goal in the preceding paragraph was to offer several factors that distinguish the left and right conditions and that are salient to a model such as the AM but that have nothing to do with the claimed distinction—the location of the critical edge with respect to the principal axis. The AM once again points to the challenge of designing carefully controlled stimulus displays that admit only



Figure 25. (a) Stimuli studied by Driver and Baylis (1999, as cited in Driver, 1999). The task is to detect a possible gap in the center triangle, which appears in the location indicated by the asterisk. Depending on the configuration of triangles, the gap will appear either left or right of the principal axis, indicated by the dashed line. (b) An image of the two stimuli superimposed such that the equilateral triangles are overlaid on one another. The dashed lines indicate the left and right edges of the two pairs of isosceles triangles. Adapted from "Egocentric and Object-Based Visual Neglect," by J. Driver. In *The Hippocampal and Parietal Foundations of Spatial Cognition* (p. 82, Figure 4.7), by N. Burgess, K. J. Jeffery, and J. O'Keefe (Eds.), 1999, New York: Oxford University Press. © Royal Society, 1999. Adapted by permission of Oxford University Press.

¹⁰ To alleviate any concern that my explanations of the isosceles-triangle and equilateral-triangle studies are inconsistent with one another, note that the distribution of visual locations in the equilateral-triangle study was the same in left and right conditions. Hence, the factor I identified as critical in the isosceles-triangle study is irrelevant in the equilateral-triangle study. And although the factor I identified as critical in the equilateral-triangle experiment—the local neighborhood around the critical edge—could have played a role in the isosceles-triangle experiment, it can be speculated that it was not as significant a factor as the distribution of visual locations containing features.




Figure 26. Simulation of the Driver and Baylis (1999) task of detecting a gap in the center triangle. Each frame shows the state of the lesioned attentional mechanism after a given number of iterations in typical trials of the left and right conditions (upper and lower frames, respectively).

one explanation for a patient's performance: the psychological reality of object-based frames.

Discussion

The neuropsychological studies I addressed are concerned with the issues of what internal representations are constructed in the ordinary course of visual information processing and whether attention can be directed in coordinates defined by the object itself. In one study, Behrmann and Tipper (1994) observed that neglect remained with the left side of an object when the object was inverted. However, this reversal of neglect was not observed for displays in which the left and right sides of the object were disconnected (Tipper & Behrmann, 1996) or for additional, fixed objects in the display (Behrmann & Tipper, 1999). Pavlovskaya et al. (1997) improved accuracy of object identification by cuing patients to a location left of the center of the object. Arguin and Bub (1993) found reaction times longer for a stimulus located on the left side of an object than the right side, controlling for retinal position of the stimulus. In two different paradigms, Driver and Halligan (1991), Driver et al. (1994), and Driver and Baylis (1999) observed neglect operating with respect to the principal axis of an object. These results were interpreted by the authors of the studies to support the psychological reality of a frame of reference other than the viewer-based frame:

The findings suggest that attention operates on object-centered as well as location-based representations, and thus accesses multiple reference frames. (Tipper & Behrmann, 1996, p. 1261)

Patients with visual neglect... represent information in both location- and object-centered frames simultaneously in the same task... These results cannot be explained by any model of attention that argues solely for a location-based medium... Rather, the current findings can only be explained by assuming that the positions of the targets are defined with respect to particular frames of reference, and that spatial position (and neglect thereof) is determined with respect to these frames. (Behrmann & Tipper, 1999, pp. 94–95)

Our data might be interpreted in terms of neglect operating in the object-centered coordinate frame. (Pavlovskaya et al., 1997, p. 828)

A stimulus-centered spatial reference frame... may be affected in the visual hemineglect syndrome... Thus, we suggest that the concept of stimulus-centered reference frame corresponds to a level of spatial representation that is generally used in human vision. (Arguin & Bub, 1993, p. 354)

Our results imply that [patient] PP's stroke has damaged neural systems which normally code visual information in... object-centred co-ordinates. (Driver & Halligan, 1991, p. 489)

A purely egocentric neglect is unable to explain the present axis-based result... [O]ur experiment shows... that the *dividing line* between neglected and spared sides... can be determined by the principal axis assigned to a shape during perception. (Driver et al., 1994, p. 1362)

Although the authors were careful to state their conclusions tentatively, the accumulation of such studies has led to widespread acceptance of the psychological reality of object-based frames of reference in visual object recognition. Because the existence of object-based frames is a fundamental source of evidence supporting certain structural-description theories of object recognition (Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982), these theories are generally viewed as canonical in the cognitive neuroscience community (e.g., Caramazza & Hillis, 1990a) and provide a motivation, often implicit, for experimental work (e.g., the studies analyzed here).

Contrary to the predominant view in cognitive neuropsychology, the simulations reported in this article suggest that object-based frames of reference are not necessary to explain the neglect data. The present model can account for the data yet operates only in a viewer-based frame.¹¹ Consequently, one must be cautious in interpreting even seemingly clear-cut experimental results without the aid of a computational model.

¹¹ Further, the model can readily explain other neglect data that have been used in support of, or that have presupposed the existence of, object-based frames, such as in Grabowecky, Robertson, and Treisman (1993), as well as data showing neglectlike object-based attentional biases in nonpatient populations, such as in Reuter-Lorenz, Drain, and Hardy-Morais (1996). The explanation of the Arguin and Bub (1993) data can be applied to these cases as well.

Evaluating the Model

Computational modeling is a valuable exercise for many reasons. A computational model provides a concrete embodiment of a theory. It forces one to be explicit about one's claims. It allows one to examine interactions among assumptions. However, a computational model makes its greatest contribution when it offers a new or fundamentally different conceptualization of data. The model described here, the AM, has succeeded in this regard. The neglect data seemed to demand an explanation involving object-based frames. No qualitative model could convincingly argue otherwise; only a simulation model could resurrect a class of explanations that would otherwise be ruled out. Even if the internal dynamics of the AM were incomprehensible to human observers, it would still provide an existence proof—a detailed model having only viewer-based frames that can nonetheless explain the data.

The inner workings of the AM are indeed difficult to comprehend. I am sometimes successful in explaining its behavior in qualitative language that can be communicated to others, but not always. The model's behavior is an emergent property of the interaction of cooperative and competitive forces. One should not expect that such complex dynamics can be reduced to a simple explanation that sidesteps the dynamics. To the degree that I have succeeded in characterizing the model's performance, the characterizations come by means of post hoc analysis of the simulation results.

Indeed, the AM has sufficiently complex dynamics that its creator has difficulty in predicting the outcome of a simulation. Many results I have modeled using the AM were unexpected and surprising. In the simulations reported here, the disconnected disk condition of Tipper and Behrmann (1996) and Driver et al. (1994) are two cases in point. The model is far more interesting and subtle than I first realized. However, its success in explaining a wide variety of data is undeniable. Each time that the model, with only trivial extensions, can explain a diverse corpus of data it was not designed around, one must increase one's confidence in the model. A relatively simple model such as the AM could not continue to provide accounts of data were it not in some basic sense correct.

As the careful reader has no doubt noticed, the AM sometimes produces curious behaviors that might have a correlate in patient behavior. I list three examples from the Behrmann and Tipper (1994; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996) simulations. (a) The AM produces a reversal of neglect in the barbell displays even if the center portion of the bar is missing (see Figure 12, lower-right panel); (b) when the barbell has been rotated 180°, there appears to be some asymmetry in the distribution of attention to the disk on the viewer left, suggesting that patient reaction times might be faster to a target on the right side of the disk than on the left (see Figure 10, lower-right panel); and (c) in the disconnected disk condition, there appears to be a short period of time during which both disks are attended (see Figure 11), suggesting that if the target appeared at the critical instant, reaction times might be comparable for the two disks.

My colleagues and I are currently testing patients on these and other experimental tasks in which contrasting predictions are made by the AM and an account relying on object-based reference frames (McGoldrick, Mozer, Munakata, & Reed, 2001). One natural reaction to the present simulation studies is that the value of the model cannot be ascertained until the model can be shown to

predict the results of novel experiments. However, this reaction is misguided, because in fact the present simulation studies already represent predictions of the model. One should not be concerned with whether the experimental data explained by the model existed in the literature prior to the simulation. Rather, the essential considerations in evaluating the predictive power of a model on an experiment are whether the model was designed with the experimental data in mind and whether the model had sufficient degrees of freedom that it could provide an interpretation for any outcome of the experiment. Neither concern is warranted in this case. Thus, in response to the question of whether the AM has any predictive power, the simple answer is that all of the results reported here are predictions of an existing, highly constrained computational model. Even if it turns out that further predictions of the model are not supported by patient studies, the model has been valuable in pointing out alternative explanations for each study simulated, and these alternative explanations could be correct even if the model is ultimately proven inadequate.

An Alternative Model

Recently, Pouget and Sejnowski (1997) and Pouget, Deneve, and Sejnowski (1999) have proposed a neurobiological model of spatial representations in parietal cortex and have used the model to explain data from the neglect literature, including phenomena that have been modeled by the AM such as line bisection and relative neglect. I view this model, which I refer to hereinafter as the *basis-function model*, as being consistent with and complementary to the AM, focusing on the neurobiological level of description rather than the psychological level. The heart of the basis-function model is the claim that neurons in the parietal cortex are tuned to respond to a stimulus appearing at a specific retinal location and this response is gain modulated by eye position. The model is referred to as a *basis-function model* because the representation supports both eye-centered and head-centered representations—the former useful for saccadic eye movements and the latter useful for reaching.

The model has two hemispheres, and although neurons in each hemisphere encode all of space, the representation in a hemisphere emphasizes the contralesional side of space. Specifically, a neuronal gradient is assumed in which the right hemisphere contains relatively many neurons coding for leftward retinal locations and leftward eye positions and relatively few neurons coding for rightward retinal locations and rightward eye positions. Consequently, a lesion to the right hemisphere results in a gradient of damage to the representation of space, most severe on the left and least severe on the right. This gradient assumption is the same as that postulated by the AM.

Beyond its claims about parietal representations, the basis-function model makes some fairly standard assumptions about the nature of attention, including a winner-take-all competition among locations, inhibition of return, and detection accuracy and speed being dependent on the saliency of a location. These processes are described at an abstract level, not in terms of neural mechanisms.

Although I view the AM and the basis-function model as being entirely consistent, the basis-function model has some virtues. First, the model makes contact with the underlying neurobiology. Second, the model deals with sensorimotor behavior as well as perception. Third, the model addresses the specific nature of the

viewer-based representation in terms of both eye-centered and head-centered coordinate frames. Fourth, the model shows that with little more than the gradient assumption, one can explain some of the data concerning relative neglect; the complex dynamics of the AM are not essential.

The basis-function model also has its limitations. First, the central claims of the model concern the representation of space, but additional claims are required about the processes that operate on the representation in order to extract responses from the model. Consequently, the model lacks a uniform mechanistic foundation to explain data from diverse experimental paradigms; hence, each new experimental paradigm seems to require additional assumptions, and the ratio of assumptions to data explained seems high relative to that of the AM. Second, although the basis-function model can explain some if not all cases of relative neglect (e.g., Arguin & Bub, 1993) without explicit object-based frames, it does not provide an explanation for the challenging studies of Behrmann and Tipper (1994, 1999; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996), nor does it provide an explanation of the Driver et al. (1994) gap-detection study without invoking object-based frames.¹² The complex dynamics of the AM are what give it the power to explain these phenomena.

Rather than viewing one model or the other as superior, I feel it is quite plausible that the strengths of the basis-function model and the AM can be integrated into a single model that accounts for an even broader range of behavioral and neurophysiological data with even fewer assumptions than either of the current models.

The Meaning of Object Based

The phrase *object based* is ambiguous, and a lack of clarity as to its intended meaning has resulted in some confusion in the literature. *Object based* can be a descriptive term for experimental results. All of the simulations of experimental studies reported in this article showed object-based effects, in that the behavior of patients was dependent not merely on the location of an object with respect to the viewer but on the extent, shape, or movement of the object itself. *Object based* can also be a characterization of processes and internal representations. Object-based representations arise from processes that use object-based frames of reference to transform visual features to achieve partial or complete view invariance. The simulations reported here show that object-based effects can be obtained without object-based representations or frames of reference.

The distinction between object-based effects and object-based representations does not entirely remove the ambiguity in the phrase *object based*. One can conceive of a continuum of senses in which a model's processes and representations might be considered object based. Examples of at least four alternatives can be found in the literature, which I present in order from weakest to strongest notions of object based. (See Driver, 1999, for a similar enumeration of alternatives.)

1. Segmentation in a viewer-based frame (Grossberg & Raizada, 2000; Mozer et al., 1992; Vecera & Farah, 1994). Some models attempt to perform segmentation, that is, grouping together the visual features that belong to one object. Segmentation can be performed in a viewer-based reference frame using grouping heuristics that exploit the statistics of objects in visual scenes. For example, the cooperation rule of the AM results in grouping of

neighboring locations in a viewer-based frame, but because neighboring locations in a viewer-based frame tend to be neighboring locations in an object-based frame, the AM tends to select objects. If other grouping heuristics were incorporated into the AM, as I suggested earlier might be necessary in a full-blown implementation of the model, then the AM's behavior would appear even more object based (and more like the model of Mozer et al., 1992).

2. Segmentation and determination of principal axis (Driver, 1999). In addition to performing segmentation in a viewer-based frame, a model might also determine the principal axis of an object—the axis of symmetry or elongation. Using the axis to establish a partial frame of reference—such as an up–down direction—visual features could be reinterpreted with respect to the partial frame. For example, Driver et al. (1994) suggested that the shape in Figure 23a evokes a principal axis from which the midline of the shape can be determined, and the left–right position of visual features is then determined with respect to the midline, although the specification of which direction is “left” and which is “right” arises from the viewer-based frame (Driver, 1999).

3. Segmentation and determination of an object-based frame of reference (Marr & Nishihara, 1978). A model might determine not only the up–down direction of an object but also its left–right and front–back direction, allowing for the establishment of a full-blown object-based frame of reference.

4. Segmentation and determination of a structural description (Biederman, 1987). To handle complex, articulated objects, a model might construct a structural description that decomposed an object to its parts and described the relationships among the parts in terms of multiple allocentric frames of reference.

Alternative 3 is the common notion of object based in the cognitive neuropsychology literature, although Driver (1999) argued that Alternative 2 is sufficient to explain key neglect data. The AM is an example of Alternative 1. Indeed, it is a simple formulation of Alternative 1, in that segmentation depends only on the proximity of features, although I am ready to concede that a more complex formulation, still within the framework of Alternative 1, will be necessary to explain a broader corpus of data. Alternative 1 provides the weakest notion of object based, in that it does not require the explicit computation of a principal axis, frame of reference, or structural decomposition. Because it is consistent with the data—as demonstrated by simulations of the AM—it seems to provide the most parsimonious account.

One might ask whether the AM is an object-based account. The preceding discussion is intended to forestall this question and to argue that the question itself is indicative of a lack of clarity concerning the various notions of *object based*. Clearly, the AM produces object-based effects. The AM also has some knowledge, albeit extremely weak and low order, about objects. However, the question should not be whether or not a model is object based but rather the

¹² Deneve and Pouget (1998) did address the Driver et al. (1994) result, but to explain in terms of the basis-function model, they must suppose that the orientation of the row of triangles is factored out, that is, the row of triangles is rotated such that its principal axis is aligned with the viewer left–right axis. This assumption is consistent with the conclusion of Driver et al. and essentially involves the establishment of an object-based frame. In contrast, the AM does not require the determination or the explicit representation of the principal axis of the row of triangles.

degree to which it requires the explicit computation of object properties, such as a principal axis, frame of reference, or structural description, and the degree to which the data mandate such computations.

The Status of Object-Based Frames of Reference in Neglect

Several researchers have noted the need for caution in invoking object-based frames of reference to explain data from patients with neglect. Buxbaum (1995), Pouget and Sejnowski (1997), Pouget et al. (1999), and Driver and Pouget (2000) argued—consistent with the present work—that apparent object-based deficits in neglect might arise from attentional gradients in viewer-based space. Driver et al. (1994) acknowledged that the object-based effects of Driver and Halligan (1991) might be attributable to a relative deficit of attention in viewer-based space. Farah (1990; see also Vecera & Farah, 1994) argued for location-based encoding of object properties and attributed object-based effects to the fact that parietal attentional processes are part of an interactive system that includes other parts of the brain that recognize objects.

Some studies have yielded no or limited support for object-based frames in neglect. Farah et al. (1990) failed to obtain neglect in an object-based frame for familiar objects. Behrmann and Moscovitch (1994) replicated this finding for both objects and symmetric-letter stimuli but did observe neglect for the intrinsic left side of asymmetric-letter stimuli. However, the finding for asymmetric letters may be attributable to their having more complex structure on the right (Drain & Reuter-Lorenz, 1997). Buxbaum, Coslett, Montgomery, and Farah (1996) eliminated object-based neglect by manipulating task instructions and suggested that mental rotation may underlie at least some cases of object-based neglect.

Two neglect-related phenomena have been reported that are not immediately explained by the AM and its viewer-based representation of space. Caramazza and Hillis (1990b; Hillis & Caramazza, 1995) have studied patients who show neglect for the right side of a word, in both perception and production, across perceptual modalities, and—most pertinent to the issue of frames of reference in visual perception—irrespective of the topographic arrangement of letters (neglect was observed for words whose letters are arranged in a column or are mirror reversed). Humphreys and Riddoch (1994, 1995; Riddoch, Humphreys, Luckhurst, Burroughs, & Bateman, 1995) have observed patients who manifest left neglect in single words but right neglect in multiple-stimulus displays. These phenomena, though undoubtedly real, do not necessarily conflict with the perspective I have presented. One might accommodate these phenomena by positing specialized visual representations or processing mechanisms for words versus other visual stimuli. Driver et al. (1994) noted the role of handedness in specifying identity of letters and words as one factor that might make words unique. For the Caramazza and Hillis (1990b) patient, Driver (1999) commented that neglect is found for letter strings presented aurally, suggesting a deficit arising at a high level of representation, not in the visual processing system. One can also argue that the phenomena implicating object-based representations arise from a complex interaction of perceptual and motor processing that is both strategic and task dependent, in contrast to the seemingly more purely perceptual tasks simulated in the present

study (Buxbaum et al., 1996). For example, reading a mirror-reversed word may involve piecing together the letters one at a time in a verbal or visual short-term store (Farah & Buxbaum, 1997), and right-sided motor neglect could explain difficulty in processing multi-item displays via the guidance of eye movements. Such motor and strategic factors contaminate the interpretation of patient performance on complex, temporally extended tasks in terms of perceptual reference frames.¹³

Other Evidence for Object-Based Frames of Reference?

In this section, I discuss three sources of evidence for object-based frames in the cognitive neuroscience literature: neurophysiological studies, object-based attentional effects in nonpatient populations and configuration effects.

In an investigation of the neural basis of object-based representations of space, Olson and Gettner (1995, 1996) trained monkeys to make saccades to the left or right side of an object and recorded activity of neurons in the supplementary eye field. They observed object-based directional sensitivity of neural activity: The response of certain neurons depended not on the direction of the saccade or the location to which the saccade was directed but on the side of the object to which the saccade was directed. These data seem to support the neurobiological reality of object-based representations. However, Deneve and Pouget (1998) presented a model that accounts for the data without relying on explicit object-based representations. Instead, neurons in the model have receptive fields defined in eye-centered coordinates, that is, they represent the direction and amplitude of saccades with respect to the fixation point and are modulated by task instructions—whether the saccade is to be directed to the left or right side of the object.

Object-based attentional effects in nonpatient populations (e.g., Duncan, 1984; Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994; Vecera, 1993) are no more a source of evidence for object-based frames than are object-based attentional effects in patients with neglect. Object-based attentional effects can be readily explained by means of a viewer-based encoding of object properties (Mozer & Sitton, 1998; Mozer et al., 1992; Vecera & Farah, 1994).

Configuration effects (Attneave, 1968; Palmer, 1980; Rock, 1997) are an intriguing source of data concerning the role of object-based frames in perception. Consider the sort of displays discussed by Mach (1886/1959), shown in Figure 27. The elements in the configuration on the left are interpreted as squares, whereas the identical elements appearing in the configuration on the right are interpreted as diamonds. A natural account of these data, the *principal-axis* account, proposes that the principal axis of the configuration is first identified and the elements are then interpreted with respect to the principal axis. Although the use of a

¹³ Many authors (e.g., Behrmann & Tipper, 1999; Humphreys & Riddoch, 1995; Vecera & Farah, 1994) have argued that task contingencies and instructions can influence whether the allocation of attention is primarily object based or location based. The availability of multiple attentional allocation strategies is pretty much orthogonal to, though consistent with, the perspective presented in this article because object-based attentional effects can be explained without object-based reference frames. However, the flexibility of attentional allocation, and strategic effects more generally, does make it more difficult to conclusively interpret data as implicating object-based or multiple reference frames in perception.




Figure 27. Configurations of elements discussed by Mach (1886/1959). The elements of the two configurations are identical, but the elements on the left are interpreted as squares and the elements on the right are interpreted as diamonds, because of the arrangement of elements.

principal axis is weaker than establishing a full-blown object-based frame of reference (see the above discussion of different notions of *object based*), it is nonetheless a computation that was not required by the AM to explain the neglect data. Other data also support the role of principal axes; for example, Ling and Sanocki (1995) found that major axes can be primed to facilitate identification. Nonetheless, one could conceive of an account that does not require explicit determination of a principal axis. The account is in the spirit of models that activate multiple interpretations based on all sources of evidence and then allow constraint satisfaction to select a single interpretation (e.g., Kintsch, 1988; Mathis & Mozer, 1996; McClelland, Rumelhart, & Hinton, 1986). By this account, which I call the *construction-integration* account following the terminology of Kintsch, the display elements in Figure 27 would activate detectors that corresponded to both diamond-at-0°-orientation and square-at-45°-orientation interpretations. In addition, for the display on the left, low spatial-frequency detectors would indicate high energy at 45° in the display. During constraint satisfaction, the 45°-square and 45°-energy detectors would mutually cooperate, the 0°-diamond and 45°-energy detectors would compete with one another, and the 45°-square and 0°-diamond detectors would also compete with one another, resulting in selection of the 45°-square interpretation of the display elements. The construction-integration and principal-axis accounts both involve two stages, but the stages are very different in nature. The elegance of a construction-integration account comes from the fact that each stage can be relatively simple, heuristic, and error prone, yet the result of the computation can be reliable. However, it remains to be seen through computational modeling whether such an account will turn out to be more parsimonious and consistent with the data than a principal-axis account.

In summary, one cannot completely discount the support for object-based frames of reference from areas of cognitive neuroscience other than neuropsychology. However, the support seems weak in that alternative explanations of the data are readily available.

Conclusions

The simulations presented in this article severely weaken the argument for object-based frames of reference in visual perception. The existence of viewer-based frames is indisputable: Early visual information is encoded with respect to retinal location and gaze direction. However, the conjecture supported by my computational model is that object-based frames of reference are not required for ordinary visual perception. The issue of reference frames is central

because it is one respect in which theories of object recognition differ. The structural-description theories of Biederman (1987) and Marr (1982) suppose that object-based frames are used in constructing visual representations from which recognition is performed, whereas view-based theories posit that recognition is performed on visual representations in a viewer-based frame.

On the surface, the neglect data discussed in this article appear to be striking evidence against view-based theories. Because object-based frames play no role in view-based theories, the existence of object-based frames would prove troublesome to view-based theories. By proposing alternative explanations of the neglect data, the present model provides an account that is compatible with view-based theories. In the absence of strong empirical support for object-based frames, either from neuropsychology, behavioral studies using nonpatient populations, or neurophysiological studies, theories of object recognition that posit the necessity of object-based frames seem doomed.

One should not interpret my line of argument as supporting the stronger conjecture that object-based frames are nonexistent in the brain. Surely if demanded by the task, people can mentally construct visual object-based representations. However, the present model suggests that such a complex cognitive ability is not called on in the course of ordinary visual perception in naturalistic environments and is built on top of a more basic perceptual apparatus that operates using viewer-based frames of reference.

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