Author: Abdulrahman Alkhelaifi
Why do the authors want to implement IFC at the hardware level?
Hardware can be leveraged to create additional information flows that violate a security policy such as timing channels if one only enforces this policy in software.
IFC allows sharing resources as opposed to separating the hardware resources into completely different levels/partitions which adds overhead and complexity.
What is the goal of SecVerilog?
Enforce fine-grained information flow control for hardware designs in a statically verifiable fashion.
How does SecVerilog achieve that goal?
Variables (registers and wires) are labeled (e.g. low and high) such that the labels specify a security lattice. The type system statically verifies that the information flow does not violate the security policy defined by the labels.
What is their attacker model? What attacks they do not consider?
The authors consider a software level adversary who can observe all public information labeled low (storage channel) as well as measure the timing of hardware operations (timing channel).
The authors do not consider physical attacks such as differential power analysis.
Is this a valid attacker model?
- The authors mention power consumption analysis as physical attack, however, it is possible to learn information about power consumption through software on many real systems (e.g., battery information).
What is a cache probing attack?
The cache is shared between processes and hence one process can affect the timing of another process’ memory access operations in an observable way that can be measured and potentially leak secret information.
Why are timing channels difficult to control?
Timing channels are difficult because secret information can affect timing in many ways. For example, in software, a loop or an if statement with a secret condition; in hardware, a shared cache as explained in the previous question.
How do the author solve timing channels?
They separate shared hardware resources (such as cache) into multiple partitions corresponding to multiple security levels (such as high and low)
The hardware design follows a set of restrictions that prevent information in the high partition (secret) from affecting the outcome or timing of information in the low partition (public).
They introduce labels for the Verilog HDL that define information flow policies and enforce them at statically.
if (h1) (labeled L) not considered a timing channel even though h1 is in the H partition?
Because the timing of the if statement is determined by the existence of h1 and not the value of h1 hence no secret information can be learned by measuring the execution time.
What are dynamic labels and why are they needed?
Dynamic labels are labels that can change at run time and are expressed as functions of some input.
They allow for sharing hardware resources between multiple security levels. For example, a register can have a dynamic label if during run time it can store both a low and a high value.
Importantly, there are no static checks to ensure IFC safety even if registers can take on different labels at run time. The static system ensure that IFC cannot be violated.
What are dependent types?
They are types whose definition depend on some value. The authors define labels with type that can be H or L depending on some value.
What is implicit declassification? How do they solve it?
Implicit declassification happens when a secret value is copied into a variable with a dynamic label that can change label from high to low at run time and potentially leak the secret value.
They insert code that dynamically deletes the content of the register if implicit declassification is detected during the static analysis.
What are label channels?
Label channels exist when the labels change dynamically and can consequently encode and leak information.
Describe two approaches to mitigate label channels and their shortcomings?
No-sensitive upgrade: forbids raising a label in a high context. Rejects safe code where a variable can safely raise its label in a high context if the variable starts with a low label before the context.
Flow-sensitive: raises the label of a variable to the context label. Rejects code where a label raise can cause a flow violation in a later code that was caused by the raised label.
How do the authors solve label channels?
They modify the above two to check the label of a variable at the merge point of a branch and verify that the new label is at least as high as the context label.
How do the authors evaluate SecVerilog?
They implement and verify a MIPS processor using SecVerilog and compare its overhead against an unverified MIPS implemented with Verilog. They find that the overhead in terms of delay, area, and power to be very small.
They compare the performance of their secure MIPS against a regular MIPS which shows significant overhead.
Why is their MIPS processor slower than a regular MIPS process?
Their implementation includes timing channel protections added to the cache and the pipeline.
They partition the cache into high and low. When the timing label is high, both high and low partitions can be accessed. However, when the timing label is low, a cache access to the high always returns a miss. This clearly adds overhead to the cache.
For the pipeline, they flush it whenever there is a change in the timing label in order to disallow a high instruction from stalling a low instruction which can leak information. This is also a clear performance overhead.