<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mail Delivery System</th>
<th>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</th>
<th>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</th>
<th>7:02 PM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mail Delivery Subsy.</td>
<td>Returned mail: see transcript for details</td>
<td>The original message was received at Sun, 17 Nov 2019 14:57:19-08...</td>
<td>3:01 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail Delivery System</td>
<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
<td>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</td>
<td>2:55 PM</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mail Delivery System</td>
<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
<td>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</td>
<td>1:34 PM</td>
</tr>
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<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
<td>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</td>
<td>1:27 AM</td>
</tr>
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<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
<td>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</td>
<td>1:26 AM</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mail Delivery System</td>
<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
<td>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</td>
<td>12:38 AM</td>
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<td>Mail Delivery System</td>
<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
<td>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</td>
<td>Nov 16</td>
</tr>
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<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
<td>This is the mail system at host foreshadow.cse.127. I'm sorry to have to ...</td>
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<td>Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender</td>
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Cryptography
Cryptography

• **Is:**
  ➤ A tremendous tool
  ➤ The basis for many security mechanisms

• **Is not:**
  ➤ The solution to all security problems
  ➤ Reliable unless implemented and used properly
Cryptography

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  ➤ Something you should try to invent yourself
  ➤ Blockchain
How Does It Work?

• Goal: learn how to use cryptographic primitives correctly
  ➤ We will treat them as a black box that mostly does what it says

• To learn what’s inside black box take CSE 107

• Do not roll your own crypto*

  * Exceptions: You are Daniel J. Bernstein, Joan Daemen, Neal Koblitz, or similar, or you have finished your PhD in cryptography under an advisor of that caliber, and your work has been accepted at Crypto, Eurocrypt, Asiacrypt, FSE, or PKC and/or NIST is running another competition, and then wait several years for full standardization and community vetting.
This class: secure communication

- Authenticity: Parties cannot be impersonated
- Secrecy: No one else can read messages
- Integrity: Messages cannot be modified
Attacker models

- Passive attacker: Eve only snoops on channel
- Active attacker: Eve can snoop, inject, block, tamper, etc.
Real-world crypto: SSL/TLS

1. Browser and web server run “handshake protocol”:
   - Establishes shared secret key using public-key cryptography

2. Browser and web server use negotiated key to symmetrically encrypt data ("Record layer")
Real-world crypto: File encryption

- Files are symmetrically encrypted with a secret key.
- The symmetric key is stored encrypted or in tamperproof hardware.
- The password is used to unlock the key so the data can be decrypted.
Outline

• Symmetric-key crypto
  ➢ Symmetric encryption
  ➢ Hash functions
  ➢ Message authentication codes

• Next time: asymmetric (public-key) crypto
  ➢ Key exchange
  ➢ Digital signatures
Symmetric-key encryption

• **Encryption**: (key, plaintext) → ciphertext
  ➤ $E_k(m) = c$

• **Decryption**: (key, ciphertext) → plaintext
  ➤ $D_k(c) = m$

• Encryption and decryption are inverse operations
  ➤ $D_k(E_k(m)) = m$
Symmetric-key encryption

- **One-time key**: used to encrypt one message
  - E.g., encrypted email, new key generate per email

- **Multi-use key**: used to encrypt multiple messages
  - E.g., SSL, same key used to encrypt many packets
Symmetric-key encryption

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Need unique/random nonce
Security definition: Passive eavesdropper

- Simplest security definition
- Secrecy against a passive eavesdropper:
  - Ciphertext reveals nothing about plaintext
  - Informal formal definition: Given $E_k(m_1)$ and $E_k(m_2)$, can’t distinguish which plaintext was encrypted without key
First example: One Time Pad

Vernam (1917)

Encryption: $c = E_k(m) = m \oplus k$

Decryption: $D_k(c) = m \oplus k$

Key: 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0

Plaintext: 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0

Ciphertext: 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
First example: One Time Pad

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First example: One Time Pad

Vernam (1917)

Encryption: $c = E_k(m) = m \oplus k$

Decryption: $D_k(c) = c \oplus k = (m \oplus k) \oplus k = m$
OTP security

• Shannon (1949)
  ➤ Information-theoretic security: without key, ciphertext reveals no “information” about plaintext

• Problems with OTP
  ➤ Can only use key once
  ➤ Key is as long as the message
Computational cryptography

• Want the size of the secret to be small
  ➤ Theorem: If size of keyspace smaller than size of message space, information-theoretic security is impossible.

• Solution: Weaken security requirement
  ➤ It should be infeasible for a computationally bounded attacker to violate security
Stream ciphers

- Problem: OTP key is as long as message
- Solution: Pseudo random key
Stream ciphers

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\[ E_k(m) = \text{PRG}(k) \oplus m \]
Stream ciphers

- **Problem**: OTP key is as long as message
- **Solution**: Pseudo random key

\[ E_k(m) = \text{PRG}(k) \oplus m \]

Computationally hard to distinguish from random
Stream ciphers

• Problem: OTP key is as long as message

• Solution: Pseudo random key

➤ Examples: ChaCha, Salsa, etc.

\[ E_k(m) = \text{PRG}(k) \oplus m \]

Computationally hard to distinguish from random
Dangers in using stream ciphers

• Can we use a key more than once?

➤ E.g., \( c_1 \leftarrow m_1 \oplus \text{PRG}(k) \)

\( c_2 \leftarrow m_2 \oplus \text{PRG}(k) \)

➤ Yes? No?
Dangers in using stream ciphers

• Can we use a key more than once?
  ➤ E.g., \( c_1 \leftarrow m_1 \oplus \text{PRG}(k) \)
  \[ c_2 \leftarrow m_2 \oplus \text{PRG}(k) \]
  ➤ Yes? No?
  ➤ Eavesdropper does: \( c_1 \oplus c_2 \rightarrow m_1 \oplus m_2 \)
  ➤ Enough redundant information in English that: \( m_1 \oplus m_2 \rightarrow m_1, m_2 \)
Security definition: Chosen plaintext attacks

• **Threat model:** Attacker can learn encryptions for arbitrary plaintexts.

• **Historical example:**
  ➤ During WWII the US Navy sent messages about Midway Island and watched Japanese ciphertexts to learn codename.

• **Modern example:**
  ➤ WEP WiFi encryption has poor randomization and can result in the same stream cipher used multiple times: This is how Aircrack works.
Block ciphers: crypto work horses

- Block ciphers operate on fixed-size blocks
  - E.g., 3DES: $|m| = |c| = 64$ bits, $|k| = 168$ bits
  - E.g., AES: $|m| = |c| = 128$ bits, $|k| = 128, 192, 256$

- A block cipher = permutation of fixed-size inputs
  - Each input mapped to exactly one output
Block ciphers: crypto work horses

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- A block cipher = permutation of fixed-size inputs
  - Each input mapped to exactly one output

Correct block cipher choice: AES
How do they work?

R(k,m): round function
for AES-128 (n=10)
How do they work?
Challenges with block ciphers
Challenges with block ciphers

- Block ciphers operate on single fixed-size block
- How do we encrypt longer messages?
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  ➢ Several modes of operation for longer messages
Challenges with block ciphers

- Block ciphers operate on single fixed-size block.
- How do we encrypt longer messages?
  - Several modes of operation for longer messages.
- How do we deal with messages that are not block-aligned?
Challenges with block ciphers

• Block ciphers operate on single fixed-size block

• How do we encrypt longer messages?
  ➤ Several modes of operation for longer messages

• How do we deal with messages that are not block-aligned?
  ➤ Must pad messages in a distinguishable way
Insecure block cipher usage:

ECB mode

Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

Source: wikipedia
Why is ECB so bad?
Why is ECB so bad?

\[ E_k(\text{Ubuntu}) = \text{Kali} \]

Source: wikipedia
Moderately secure usage:

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

Source: wikipedia
Moderately secure usage:

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

Subtle attacks that abuse padding possible!

Source: wikipedia
Better block cipher usage:

Counter (CTR) mode encryption

Source: wikipedia
Better block cipher usage:

Counter (CTR) mode encryption

Essentially use block cipher as stream cipher!
What security do we actually get?

- All encryption breakable by brute force given enough knowledge about plaintext
  - Try to decrypt ciphertext with every possible key until a valid plaintext is found
- Attack complexity proportional to size of key space
  - 128-bit key requires $2^{128}$ decryption attempts
Security definition: Chosen ciphertext attacks

• What if Eve can alter the ciphertexts sent between Alice and Bob?

• Symmetric encryption alone is not enough to ensure security.
  ➢ Need to protect integrity of ciphertexts (and thus underlying encrypted messages)
Outline

• Symmetric-key crypto
  ➢ Encryption
  ➢ Hash functions
  ➢ Message authentication codes

• Asymmetric (public-key) crypto
  ➢ Key exchange
  ➢ Digital signatures
Hash Functions

- A (cryptographic) hash function maps arbitrary length input into a fixed-size string
  
  $m \xrightarrow{H} h$  \hspace{1cm} \text{or}  \hspace{1cm} h = H(m)$

- $|m|$ is arbitrarily large
- $|h|$ is fixed, usually 128-512 bits
Hash Function Properties

• Finding a preimage is hard
  ➤ Given $h$, find $m$ such that $H(m) = h$

• Finding a collision is hard
  ➤ Find $m_1$ and $m_2$ such that $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$
Hash function bit security

- A 128-bit output hash function only has 64 bits of security
  - It takes $2^{64}$ time to find a collision
  - Why? Birthday bound
Real-world crypto: Hash functions

• Versioning systems (e.g., git)
  ➢ Better than _1, _final, _really_final

• Sub-resource integrity
  ➢ Integrity of files you include from CDN

• File download integrity
  ➢ Make sure the thing you download is the thing you thought you were downloading
Maintainer: Deian Stefan

pkgname=xwrits
pkgver=2.26
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="reminds you to take wrist breaks"
arch=('any')
url=('http://www.lcdf.org/xwrits/
license=('GPLv2')
depends=()
makedepends=()
conflicts=()
source=('http://www.lcdf.org/xwrits/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz')
sha256sums=('aaca4809b4cd6a627335ca14a231d4ab556fc872458b6f6e76b103fed8')
sha512sums=('c8beeca957e41468d85819a7d6d4475c83a99735ff17d13d724658a421d1d3b9a15191ee8ab903104ab19b869a4832103d6e7d3ec2a9bf89ae95a7899e92f927')

build() {
  cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
  ./configure --prefix=/usr
  make
}

check() {
  cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
  make -k check
}

package() {
  cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
  make DESTDIR="$pkgdir/" install
}
Hash Functions

- **MD5: Message Digest**
  - Designed by Ron Rivest
  - Very popular hash function
  - Output: 128 bits
  - Broken — **do not use!**
Hash Functions

• SHA-1: Secure Hash Algorithm 1
  ➢ Designed by NSA
  ➢ Output: 160 bits
  ➢ Broken — *do not use!*

• SHA-2: Secure Hash Algorithm 2
  ➢ Designed by NSA
  ➢ Output: 224, 256, 384, or 512 bits
  ➢ Recommended for use today
Hash Functions

- SHA-3: Secure Hash Algorithm 3
  - Result of NIST SHA-3 contest
  - Output: arbitrary size
  - Replacement once SHA-2 broken
Outline

• Symmetric-key crypto
  ➤ Symmetric Encryption
  ➤ Hash functions
  ➤ Message authentication code

• Next time: asymmetric (public-key) crypto
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  ➤ Digital signatures
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MACs

- Validate message integrity based on shared secret
- MAC: Message Authentication Code
  - Keyed function using shared secret
  - Hard to compute function without knowing key

\[ a = \text{MAC}_k(m) \]
MAC constructions

- HMAC: MAC based on hash function

\[ \text{MAC}_k(m) = H( k \oplus \text{opad} \ || \ H( k \oplus \text{ipad} \ || \ m ) ) \]

- HMAC-SHA256: HMAC construction using SHA-256
- A perfectly fine modern choice.
Combining MAC with encryption

MAC then Encrypt (SSL)

➤ Integrity for plaintext not ciphertext

➤ Issue: need to decrypt before you can verify integrity

➤ Hard to get right!
Combining MAC with encryption

Encrypt and MAC (SSH)

- Integrity for plaintext not ciphertext
- Issue: need to decrypt before you can verify integrity
- Hard to get right!
Combining MAC with encryption

Encrypt then MAC (IPSec)

- Integrity for plaintext and ciphertext
- Always right!

![Diagram of Encrypt then MAC (IPSec) process]
Correct encryption solution: Use AEAD construction

- Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
  - AES-GCM, AES-GCM-SIV

- Always use an authenticated encryption mode
  - Combines mode of operation with integrity protection/MAC in the right way
Authenticated encryption

Example

```c
#define MESSAGE ((const unsigned char *) "test")
#define MESSAGE_LEN 4
#define CIPHERTEXT_LEN (crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES + MESSAGE_LEN)

unsigned char key[crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES];
unsigned char nonce[crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES];
unsigned char ciphertext[CIPHERTEXT_LEN];

crypto_secretbox_keygen(key);
randombytes_buf(nonce, sizeof nonce);
crypto_secretbox_easy(ciphertext, MESSAGE, MESSAGE_LEN, nonce, key);

unsigned char decrypted[MESSAGE_LEN];
if (crypto_secretbox_open_easy(decrypted, ciphertext, CIPHERTEXT_LEN, nonce, key) != 0)
    /* message forged! */
```