Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening

Authors

Mihir Bellare, Dennis Hofheinz, and Scott Yilek

Abstract

The existence of encryption and commitment schemes secure under selective opening attack (SOA) has remained open despite considerable interest and attention. We provide the first public key encryption schemes secure against sender corruptions in this setting. The underlying tool is lossy encryption. We then show that no non-interactive or perfectly binding commitment schemes can be proven secure with black-box reductions to standard computational assumptions, but any statistically hiding commitment scheme is secure. Our work thus shows that the situation for encryption schemes is very different from the one for commitment schemes.

Reference

Mihir Bellare, Dennis Hofheinz, and Scott Yilek.
Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS Vol. 5479, pp. 1-35, A. Joux ed., Springer, 2009.

[BibTex]

Note

Our paper, along with that of Hofheinz, were submitted to Eurocrypt 2009. They were accepted under the condition that they be merged. The reference above is for the merged paper. Full versions have, however, been written separately (see links below).

Versions

Our Full Version

See Also

Hofheinz's Full Version
Eurocrypt 2009
Our Full Version on ePrint