Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks

Authors: M. Bellare, M. Fischlin, S. Goldwasser and S. Micali

Abstract: We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.

Ref: Extended abstract in Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt 2001 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 2045 , B. Pfitzmann ed, Springer-Verlag, 2001. Full paper available below.

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