



STREAM CIPHERS and PRGs

Stateful Generators

Initially, St is a random seed



Operation:




$X[1]X[2]X[3]...$ is the output sequence and should be “pseudorandom”.

$$(X[1] \dots X[m], St) \leftarrow G(St, m)$$

means we

- Run G with starting state St for m steps
- Let $X[1] \dots X[m]$ be the output blocks produced
- Let St be the updated state



Usage for Encryption

Alice maintains a state St_A and Bob maintains a state St_B .
Initially: $St_A = St_B$ is a random seed.

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{E}(M[1] \dots M[m]) \\ (X[1] \dots X[m], St_A) \leftarrow G(St_A, m) \\ \text{for } i = 1, \dots, m \text{ do} \\ \quad C[i] \leftarrow X[i] \oplus M[i] \end{array} \quad \left| \quad \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{D}(C[1] \dots C[m]) \\ (X[1] \dots X[m], St_B) \leftarrow G(St_B, m) \\ \text{for } i = 1, \dots, m \text{ do} \\ \quad M[i] \leftarrow X[i] \oplus C[i] \end{array} \right.$$

Note that the states must be synchronized!

Usage for Pseudorandom Bit Generation

G is initialized with a random seed and its outputs are then used coins for any purpose needing randomness, including:

- Keys
- IVs for block-cipher based encryption
- Nonces
- Simulations

- Linear Congruential Generators (LCGs)
- Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs)

These have

- Good statistical properties: $\#1\text{'s} \approx \#0\text{'s}$; Chi-square; ...
- But are predictable: Given some outputs can infer future ones

Predictability can be exploited to break encryption privacy via a chosen-message attack.


Cryptographic constructs

- (Alleged)-RC4
- SEAL (1.0, 2.0)

Theoretical Security Requirement

INDR : Indistinguishability from random

- Pick a random seed St and let $(X_1[1] \dots X_1[m], St) \leftarrow G(St, m)$
- Pick $X_0[1] \dots X_0[m]$ at random
- Pick a challenge bit b at random



A is trying to compute b .

G is secure if no practical A has high advantage.

Formalization

Let G be a stateful generator with seed length s and output-block length n .

Game INDR_G

procedure Initialize

$\text{St} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^s; b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$

procedure Next(m)

$(X_1[1] \dots X_1[m], \text{St}) \leftarrow G(\text{St}, m)$

$X_0[1] \dots X_0[m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{nm}$

return $X_b[1] \dots X_b[m]$

procedure Finalize(b')

return $(b = b')$

The indr advantage of adversary A is

$$\text{Adv}_G^{\text{indr}}(A) = 2 \Pr \left[\text{INDR}_G^A \Rightarrow \text{true} \right] - 1$$

Stream Ciphers / PRGs from Block Ciphers


Let $E : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a block cipher, and define:

algorithm $G(\text{St})$

$(K, i) \leftarrow \text{St}$ // Parse St as (K, i)

$X \leftarrow E_K(i + 1)$; return $(X, (K, i + 1))$

- State has the form (K, i) where K is a key for E and i is an n -bit integer ($0 \leq i < 2^n$).
- Initial state is $(K, 0)$ where $K \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$.



Fact: If E is a secure PRF, then G is an INDR secure PRG.

Similarly, other modes of operation of block ciphers also give rise to PRGs.

ANSI X9.17 PRG


Let $E : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a block cipher and define

algorithm $G(\text{St})$

$(K, S) \leftarrow \text{St}$ // Parse St as (K, S)

$X \leftarrow E_K(S); S \leftarrow E_K(X); \text{return}(X, (K, S))$

- state has the form (K, S) where K is a key for E and $S \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- Initial state has both K and S chosen at random.




The standard uses $E = \text{DES}$ in 2-key EDE mode.

Analysis: [DHL02]

Other Standards, Implementations

- Two PRGs are specified in FIPS-186, based on DES or SHA-1
- NIST SP 800-90 specifies hash-based, HMAC-based, CTR-based, and ECC based generators.
- ANSI X9.31 and ANSI X9.62
- OpenSSL specifies a SHA-1 based PRG.

Forward Security




Suppose adversary obtains St_2 . Then

- It can compute $X[3]X[4] \dots$
- But can it compute $X[1]X[2]$?

Forward security requires that the answer to the latter question be “NO”.

Important in the face of exposure due to malware and system compromise.

Forward Security Failures



If adversary gets $(K, 2)$ then it can compute

$$X[1] = E_K(0); X[2] = E_K(1).$$

Similar failures for ANSI X9.17.


A Forward Secure PRG [BY]

Let $E : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a block cipher, and define:

algorithm $G(K)$

$X \leftarrow E_K(0)$; $K \leftarrow E_K(1)$; return (X, K)

- State is a key K for E
- Initial state is a random $K \xleftarrow{s} \{0, 1\}^n$.



The Full Process

In practice, random number generation (RNG) involves

- Seeding
- PRG

Failures in RNG are common: Netscape, Debian Linux, ...

They arise from failures in either component.

In principle, we know how to design good PRGs.

But seeding remains a problem.

Typical methods:

- Maintain an “entropy pool” based on system events, user keystrokes, ...
- Mix in more entropy as needed.

Example: OpenSSL

Alternative: Hardware RNGs