Note that Pr(A|B) = 0.8 does not mean "Pr(A) = 0.8 always when B is true." It may be the case, for example, that Pr(A|B) = 0.8 and also Pr(A|B & C) = 0.
If the event A is independent of the event B, then Pr(A|B) = Pr(A & B) / Pr(B) = (Pr(A) * Pr(B)) / Pr(B) = Pr(A), assuming that the denominators are non-zero. When doing probability calculations, you always have to pay attention to the case of probabilities that are zero.
The "product rule" says that Pr(A & B) = Pr(A|B)Pr(B).
This is true by the definition of Pr(A|B).
Recursively, we have Pr(A1
& A2 & A3) = Pr(A1)Pr(A2|A1)Pr(A3|A1,A2) and so on.
What Bayes discovered is this formula:
Pr(Y|X) = Pr(Y & X)/Pr(X) = (Pr(X|Y)Pr(Y)) / Pr(X)
Often we do not know directly what Pr(X) is, but we can
calculate it easily using the fact Pr(X) = Pr(X and Y) + Pr(X and not Y).
Example (taken from below): "... a mammography problem: ... For symptom-free women aged 40 to 50 who participate in screening using mammography, the following information is available ... The probability that one of these women has breast cancer is 1%. If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will have a positive mammography test. If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability is 10% that she willstill have a positive mammography test. Imagine a woman (aged 40 to 50, no symptoms) who has a positive mammography test in your breast cancer screening. What is the probability that she actually has breast cancer?
... The correct answer is P(breast cancer | positive test) = (.01)(.80)/[(.01)(.80) + (.99)(.10)] = .0748.
Review of The Psychology of Good Judgment by Gerd Gigerenzer (1996). Medical Decision Making, 16(3), 273-280.
Gigerenzer argues that physicians and their patients will better understand the chance of a false positive result if we replace the conventional conditional probability analysis by an equivalent frequency method.... Frequency format: Ten out of every 1,000 women have breast cancer. Of these 10 women with breast cancer, 8 will have a positive mammography test. Of the remaining 990 women without breast cancer, 99 will still have a positive mammography test.Imagine a sample of women (aged 40 to 50, no symptoms) who have positive mammography tests in your breast cancer screening. How many of these women do actually have breast cancer? _____ out of _____
In a classic study by D. M. Eddy (see Dowie J. Elstein (ed.) (1988), Professional Judgment: A Reader in Clinical Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, pp. 45-590), essentially this same question, with just the probability format, was given to 100 physicians. Ninety-five of the physicians gave the answer of approximately 75% instead of the correct answer, which, in this example, is 7.48%.
In the present study, Gigerenzer found that, when the information was presented in the probability format, only 10% reasoned with the Bayes computation P(breast cancer | positive test) = (.01)(.80)/[(.01)(.80) + (.99)(.10)] = .0748.
For the group given the frequency format, 46% computed the Bayes probability in the simpler form: P(breast cancer | positive test) = 8/(8 + 99) = .0748.
The article discusses some of the reactions of the physicians to even considering such problems. Here are some quotes:On such a basis one can't make a diagnosis. Statistical information is one big lie.I never inform my patients about statistical data. I would tell the patient that mammography is not so exact, and I would in any case perform a biopsy.
Oh, what nonsense. I can't do it. You should test my daughter. She studies medicine.
Statistics is alien to everyday concerns and of little use for judging individual persons.