Abstract

We present four new history sniffing attacks. Our attacks fit into two classical categories—visited-link attacks and cache-based attacks—but abuse new, modern browser features (e.g., the CSS Paint API and JavaScript bytecode cache) that do not account for privacy when handling cross-origin URL data. We evaluate the attacks against four major browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and IE) and several security-focused browsers (ChromeZero, Brave, FuzzyFox, DeterFox, and the Tor Browser). Two of our attacks are effective against all but the Tor Browser, whereas the other two target features specific to Chromium-derived browsers. Moreover, one of our visited-link attacks (CVE-2018-6137) can exfiltrate history at a rate of 3,000 URLs per second, an exfiltration rate that previously led browser vendors to break backwards compatibility in favor of privacy. We hope that this work will lead browser vendors to further reconsider the design of browser features that handle privacy-sensitive data.

1 Introduction

Browsing history can reveal a lot about a person: their age, gender, location, political leanings, preferred adult sites—even who they are in the real world [57, 58]. And one user’s browsing history can spill other users’ secrets, thanks to social networking websites like Facebook and LinkedIn [53]. Anyone who touches a search bar should care about safeguarding this sensitive data.

In principle it should be straightforward; after all, the web platform provides no direct means for JavaScript to read out a user’s history. In practice, things get more complicated. Browsers still allow web developers to perform a restricted (and occasionally dangerous) set of computations on history data. For example, using the CSS :visited and :link selectors, developers can conditionally style a link based on whether its destination URL appears in the user’s browsing history. And what a developer can do, an attacker can do too—so browsers must account for all kinds of abuse, like exploiting CSS selectors as side channels to “sniff” a URL for visited status.

As early as 2002, attackers discovered ways of detecting whether a :visited selector matched a given link element; by pointing the link’s destination to a URL of interest, they could leak whether a victim had visited that URL [4–6, 10, 23]. Many popular websites put these attacks into production, actively profiling their visitors; a developer could even purchase off-the-shelf history sniffing “solutions” [24]. Once browsers closed these holes, attackers discovered that they could abuse different browser features, like the MozAfterPaint event or the requestAnimationFrame API, to steal the same data, or could use :visited selectors to trick their victims into giving information away [5, 49, 57]; attackers also learned to leak history information through timing channels based on browsers’ caching of embedded resources (e.g., images or scripts) [7, 14, 53].

In response, browser vendors continue to plug leaks ad-hoc, as they are discovered. At the same time, they rush to support new features and new APIs to accommodate new classes of applications, from video games to IoT to virtual and augmented reality. Of course, to ensure that new applications run with reasonable performance, browser vendors also continuously add new caches and optimizations. This increasingly complex piping introduces more joints from which history data may leak—from the CSS Paint API to the JavaScript bytecode cache—and on-demand plumbing won’t keep up with the flow forever.

In this paper we present new history sniffing attacks that abuse the complexities of modern browsers. We demonstrate: (1) three visited-link attacks, abusing new browser features which give attackers a range of capabilities to operate on sensitive history data, from executing arbitrary JavaScript code in the rendering pipeline with the CSS Paint API [50], to composing complex graphical computations using CSS and SVG; and (2) a cache-timing attack that abuses Chrome’s new JavaScript bytecode
We propose to use Tor Browser, and our attack on the CSS Paint API even in brevity, we elide the protocol and port throughout the paper.

Protocol-host-port triples (e.g., https://www.example.com:443) link elements pointing to previously-visited URLs. For :visited according to history data: a developer can use the CSS Visited-link attacks

Private browsing habits. We describe two such history attacks and five security-focused browsers (ChromeZero, Brave, FuzzyFox, DeterFox, and the Tor Browser). Two of our attacks target features specific to the Chrome family of browsers while the other two are more general. Our attacks can exfiltrate history data on all browsers except the Tor Browser, and our attack on the CSS Paint API even does so at the high rate of 3,000 URLs per second. To our knowledge, this is the fastest visited-link attack since Janc and Olejnik’s 2010 attack [23]; Google assigned the new attack CVE-2018-6137 and awarded a $2,000 bounty.

While browser vendors have already begun to plug these individual leaks, new features and caches will continue to allow attackers to steal sensitive information. This need not be the case. Much like browsers enforce the same-origin policy (SOP) in a principled way—ensuring that one origin can’t read sensitive data from another origin—they could similarly build architectural protections around history data. As first a step in this direction, we propose to (1) associate the referring origin with all persistent URL data, including history and cache entries, and (2) only expose this data to code—whether web applications or core browser components—running on behalf of the same origin.

In the next section, we give a brief review of history sniffing and related work. Then, we describe our attacks and the browser features that enable them: the CSS Paint API (Section 3.1), CSS 3D Transforms (Section 3.2), fill-coloring SVG images (Section 3.3), and the JavaScript bytecode cache (Section 4). In Section 5 we evaluate these attacks on different browsers, and describe a principled approach to eliminating them altogether.

2 Background and related work

Browsers keep track of the URLs that their users visit in order to (1) help those users recognize sites that they have already visited (e.g., by marking familiar links with a different color), and (2) speed up browsing by caching resources to avoid network requests. Unfortunately, web attackers [1] can exploit this saved state to learn users’ private browsing habits. We describe two such history sniffing attacks below.

Visited-link attacks Browsers let developers style links according to history data: a developer can use the CSS :visited selector to write style rules that only apply to link elements pointing to previously-visited URLs. For example, the following CSS rules color links blue when unvisited and purple otherwise:

```css
/* Default link color to blue: */
a { color: blue; }

/* Turn visited links purple: */
a:visited { color: purple; }
```

Through JavaScript, a developer can query any element’s computed style properties by calling its getComputedStyle method, which returns data such as {color: "purple"}. Previously, calling this on a link element styled as above directly leaked whether or not the user had visited that link’s destination URL [10]. Browsers also permitted targeting arbitrary styles to visited links with the :visited selector: based on a link’s (secret) visited status, an attacker could peruse its appearance with CSS in ways the attacker could then observe through JavaScript.

In response to real-world history sniffing attacks of this kind [12, 24], major browsers adopted a pair of mitigations [4, 5, 46, 57]. First, they addressed explicit leaks through getComputedStyle by lying about the computed style of a link: the method now always returns the unvisited version of the link’s style. Second, they addressed implicit leaks by limiting :visited link styling to colors—which are supposed to be unobservable by JavaScript—and updating browser layout engines to cache links’ computed styles where possible, in place of re-calculating them, in an effort to avoid timing attacks.

Weinberg et al. [57] demonstrated that these mitigations are not enough—that web attackers can still creatively leak history information. They used interactive tasks (e.g., CAPTCHAs) to trick users into disclosing history information, inferred the color of links from screen reflections in webcam images, and used re-paint events—at the time directly exposed to JavaScript—to observe when a link’s visited status changed according to an update of its destination URL. After browser vendors responded by removing the functionality exposing re-paint events to JavaScript, Paul Stone showed how attackers could still detect re-paints through a straightforward timing attack [49].

Our work continues in this tradition, using a variety of modern browser features to build new visited-link attacks which are fast (leak the visited status of many URLs per second), reliable (work across different browsers and operating systems), invisible (conceal their presence), and automated (require no special interaction from the victim).

Browser-cache attacks Browsers rely on many layers of caching to speed up web applications; by caching a resource like an HTML document or a video, browsers avoid the overhead of re-fetching that resource the second
time a user visits a page. Most browsers use only the resource URL to index cache entries, and do not take into account the origin of the page embedding the resource [22]. As Felten and Schneider showed in 2000 [14], this allows a web attacker at https://evil.com to perform a cross-origin request to https://fb.com, say, and to learn if the user has visited the other site by measuring the duration of that request. The request is faster if the resource from https://fb.com is already in the cache, and slower if the browser must fetch it over the network—measurably so, if the target resource is sufficiently large.

Van Goethem et al. [53] show how more recent browser features—the Application Cache [54] and Service Workers APIs [43]—can also leak history data and other private user information. Kim et al. [27] use the Quota Management API [59] for similar attacks; these efforts are part of a broader class of web privacy cache-based attacks [7, 15, 17, 31, 32, 40, 41, 44, 56, 58]. We present our own cache-based attack, with particularly strong reliability, precision, and applicability to a wide range of target sites.

3 Visited-link attacks on history

In this section we describe three related attacks on visited links that reveal user browsing history to an attacker. These “re-paint” attacks each exploit a fundamental vulnerability in how modern browsers handle visited links: by forcing the browser to re-paint according to a link’s visited status and measuring when re-paint events occur, an attacker can learn whether or not the URL pointed to by the link has been visited.Attackers can detect the visited status of arbitrary, exact URLs, including path information (so they can distinguish https://usenix.org/conference/woot-2018 from https://usenix.org). Moreover, they can do this without being perceived by the victim.

3.1 Abusing the CSS Paint API

First, we show how an attacker can sniff history data using the CSS Paint API. The CSS Paint API, introduced in 2018, lets websites hook into the browser’s rendering pipeline and draw parts of HTML elements themselves—for example, to fill the background of a web page with a repeating checkerboard pattern that adapts to any window size and display resolution. By detecting when these hooks are invoked, an attacker can observe when the browser re-paints a link element on the page. Toggling a link between destination URLs causes the link to be re-painted if its visited status changes, so the attacker can infer whether or not those URLs have been visited.

Background The CSS Paint API allows a developer to plug dynamically-generated graphics into any context where CSS would normally accept a static image [50]. It does so using “paint worklets” (or “paintlets”), small JavaScript programs that run in their own, self-contained execution contexts. Paintlets all contain a paint callback, a JavaScript function that accepts as arguments a handle to a drawing canvas, the desired image dimensions, and a read-only set of properties and their values. To create the checkerboard background we mentioned above, the developer makes a paintlet with a paint callback that loops through the canvas width and height to draw evenly-spaced squares. Within the paintlet script, they then use the registerPaint function to associate their paintlet with a custom identifier like checkers. Then, in their CSS file, the developer sets the page’s background image to paint(checkers), where paint is the CSS command for referencing a paintlet. Now the browser will show the checkerboard pattern when a user navigates to the developer’s page, and if the user re-sizes the window, the pattern will automatically adjust to fit. This is because, for each element the checkers paintlet is set up to draw, the browser invokes the paintlet’s paint callback whenever it detects a “paint invalidation” on that element: any event that might change how the canvas is rendered (e.g., when the element is initially created or when its dimensions change).

Attack An attacker can use the CSS Paint API to observe whether a URL was visited by (1) crafting a link element that gets re-painted only if its associated URL is visited and (2) using a timing channel (leaking information through the timing of browser operations) to determine whether the re-paint took place. Suppose an attacker wants to determine if a victim has visited https://ashleymadison.com. First, the attacker chooses a dummy link that they know the victim has not visited (e.g., https://dummy.com; or a randomly-generated URL). The attacker then creates a link element pointing to the dummy destination and sets the link’s background image to be rendered by a paintlet:

\[
\text{<a id="target" href="https://dummy.com">link</a>}
\]

\[
\text{<style>}
\text{#target {background-image: paint(myEvilPainter);}}
\text{</style>}
\]

When the browser initially draws the link, it will invoke myEvilPainter’s paint callback.

Later, in a normal (non-paintlet) script, the attacker switches the link’s destination to the actual target URL (without changing the displayed link text): target.href = "https://ashleymadison.com". If neither the dummy, known-unvisited URL nor the target
The longer delta indicates that the change from dummy URL to target URL caused a re-paint, which in turn means that the victim visited the target URL.

We note that re-paints (e.g., as triggered by an attacker) are not instantaneous—they are queued and handled when the browser renders the “next” frame [38]. Since today’s browsers render web pages at a (target) speed of 60 frames per second, this puts an upper bound on the rate of re-paints—and thus the bandwidth (rate of URLs tested per second) of re-paint attacks. Using a single target link, for example, means that our attack can—at best—exfiltrate 60 URLs per second.

Amplified attack We consider an alternative, amplified attack that uses multiple link elements, each pointing to a different target URL.\(^1\) This attack consists of two phases: (1) a record phase that uses a paintlet to scan target URLs and stow away their visited statuses by abusing

\(^1\)We find using 1,024 links at a time provides optimal bandwidth.

the registerPaint function; and (2) an exfiltrate phase that uses another paintlet to “read” the visited status bits and communicate them—via a CSS covert channel—to a normal, non-paintlet attacker script. We describe these two phases below.

Record. In this phase, the attacker first generates a unique identifier string for each target URL (e.g., ashleyMadison for https://ashleymadison.com). As in our previous attack, the attacker then sets the background of each link element to be rendered by a paintlet. But, in this attack, the paint callback does not block the event loop to leak the visited status of the URL. Instead, the callback uses registerPaint to associate the paintlet with a new identifier: the old identifier suffixed with _visited. This ensures that if the victim visited https://ashleymadison.com, for example, the ashleyMadison_visited identifier is associated with a paintlet—but not otherwise. In the exfiltration phase we use this to leak the visited status of the URL.

We note that although the attacker could create a paintlet for each URL, with a different identifier baked into the code of each paintlet, our record phase only needs a single paintlet:

```javascript
paint (ctx, geometry, properties) {
  // Get identifier (e.g., ashleyMadison):
  var iden = properties.getFontFamily();
  // Associate this paintlet with tweaked identifier (e.g., ashleyMadison_visited):
  registerPaint('${iden}_visited', ...);
}
```

By setting the CSS font-family style of a link to the URL identifier, the attacker can communicate to the paint callback which URL the re-paint is running on behalf of and avoid creating thousands of paintlets.

Exfiltrate. After feeding all the target URL batches through their set of link elements, the attacker creates a new paintlet to check which possible *_visited identifiers were registered—corresponding to the set of visited target URLs. To this end, the paintlet calls registerPaint with each possible identifier. If the identifier has already been registered (during the record phase), registerPaint throws an exception to complain about the duplicate call. The paintlet catches these exceptions and, for each already-registered identifier, registers a new unique identifier based on the old:

```javascript
try {
  // Try to associate identifier
  // (e.g., ashleyMadison_visited):
  registerPaint(iden, ...);
} catch (e) {
  // Create new identifier from the old
  // (e.g., ashleyMadison_exfiltrate):
  var newIden = iden.replace('_visited', '_exfiltrate');
}
```
For example, if the identifier ashleyMadison_visited was registered in the record phase, this paintlet will now additionally register ashleyMadison_exfiltrate.

The attacker detects these new paintlet identifier registrations using a quirk of the CSS Paint API implementation. Right before creating the “exfiltrate” paintlet, the attacker inserts a series of elements into the page—one per possible _exfiltrate_ identifier—styling each with CSS of the following form:

```css
#ashleyMadison_element::after {
  content: paint(ashleyMadison_exfiltrate);
}
```

This CSS code selects the HTML element with identifier ashleyMadison_element and inserts a new image element as its last child (via the ::after “pseudo-element” selector feature [34]). To draw this image, the content rule specifies that the browser should invoke the paint callback of the paintlet registered to the ashleyMadison_exfiltrate identifier; the browser gets around to handling this after the attacker’s “exfiltrate” paintlet runs. And now, the quirk: if this paintlet identifier was just registered, then the browser calculates a large width value for the child image element. Otherwise—if ashleyMadison_exfiltrate was not just registered, or was not registered at all—the image element gets a small width. The attacker can loop back through the _element elements and check their widths: a large width corresponds to a visited URL.

**Evaluation** Our amplified attack can probe a user’s browsing history at 3,000 URLs per second without the victim noticing, i.e., we can scan Alexa Internet’s list of Top 100,000 Websites [2] in 30–40 seconds—in the background, with no visible effect on the page, and with no interaction required from the victim.³ This rate is comparable to the original :visited attacks that led browser vendors to break backwards compatibility in order to address them [6].

Google Chrome is the only browser that has implemented the CSS Paint API, so it is also the only browser affected by this attack; we successfully performed the attack on Chrome 66.0.3359.117 under Windows, macOS, and Ubuntu Linux. In response, Google assigned CVE-2018-6137 to our report and rewarded a $2,000 bug bounty. Their patch for the Chrome 67 release includes an interim fix that disables the CSS Paint API on link elements and their children.

³The Alexa list compresses down to only 650 KB, compared to the median compressed web page size of 1500 KB [21], leaving plenty of room for even longer target URL lists to be downloaded to victims’ browsers without arousing suspicion.

**3.2 Abusing CSS 3D transforms**

Our attack using paintlets showed how browsers leak history when JavaScript hooks directly into the rendering pipeline, but attackers can also exploit more indirect leaks in web page rendering. The next attack takes advantage of CSS 3D transforms, which developers can use to translate, rotate, project, and even animate HTML elements in a three-dimensional space [19, 28, 30]. An attacker stacks these 3D transforms on top of other CSS effects to create a link element that the victim’s browser struggles to draw. Then the attacker repeatedly toggles the link element between two different destination URLs and, using the :visited selector, forces the browser to complete expensive re-paint operations when the link changes visited status. The presence of these re-paints leaks whether the destination URLs were visited by the victim, information that the attacker harvests by monitoring the page’s rendering performance through JavaScript.

**Background** As of CSS version 3, developers can mark up HTML elements with transformations [36]. To rotate an image 45 degrees clockwise, two-dimensionally, the developer would write this CSS `transform` rule:

```css
#photo { transform: rotateZ(45deg); }
```

They can even embed multiple commands in a single `transform` rule by specifying an ordered list of transformations for the browser to apply. Adding the `perspective()` command further enables 3D transformations, like `rotateY()`, which rotates an element around its vertical axis:

```css
#photo {
  transform: perspective(100px) rotateY(45deg);
}
```

Figure 1 shows the results of these transformations. They can even be combined with other CSS post-processing effects: the `filter` rule, for example, offers contrast, saturation, drop-shadow, and other visual adjustments one would expect to find in photo-editing software [35].

**Attack** As in Section 3.1, an attacker wishing to detect whether their victim has visited https://ashleymadison.com first creates a link pointing to a known-unvisited dummy URL (e.g.,

---

**Figure 1:** Examples of CSS `transform` on an image element: first, rotating it 45 degrees clockwise in the 2D plane; then, rotating it 45 degrees clockwise around its vertical (Y) axis.
We experimented with different effects to come up with the link:

```css
#target {
    transform: perspective(100px) rotateY(37deg);
    filter: 
        contrast(200%)
        drop-shadow(16px 16px 10px #fefe)
        saturate(200%);
    transition: 16px 16px 10px #fefe;
    outline-width: 24px;
    font-size: 2px; text-align: center;
    display: inline-block;

    color: white;
    background-color: white;
    outline-color: white;
}
```

Next, the attacker toggles the link’s destination URL from `https://dummy.com` to `https://ashleymadison.com` via JavaScript, as in Section 3.1’s attack. Suppose the victim has, in fact, visited `https://ashleymadison.com`. Changing the link’s destination switches its visited status from `false` to `true`, which in turn changes its color values from white to near-white (thanks to the `:visited` styles); as a result, the victim’s browser must re-draw the link from scratch with the new colors. The particular color choices here make the link invisible to the victim when placed against a white background, and the change from white to near-white is similarly imperceptible; the link could even be hiding in the background of this paper, and the reader would be none the wiser.

Swapping the link’s destination URL once—toggling its visited status—causes the victim’s browser to perform a costly computation, holding up the page’s rendering cycle while it completes. Doing so repeatedly—ping-ponging back and forth between `https://dummy.com` and `https://ashleymadison.com`—causes paint performance for the containing page to drop significantly (but not for the rest of the browser, or for scrolling, thanks to modern browsers’ parallel, multi-process architectures). If the attacker measures this performance drop, they learn that their victim is an Ashley Madison user. On the other hand, if `https://ashleymadison.com` is unvisited like `https://dummy.com`, then swapping the link between these destination URLs `doesn’t` change its visited status, `doesn’t` change its color values, `doesn’t` force the victim’s browser to repeat the expensive rendering computations—and `doesn’t` yield a corresponding drop in the page’s paint performance.

To harvest from this leak, the attacker needs to monitor the overall paint performance of the page while they repeatedly toggle their link’s destination URL; there are many ways to accomplish this from JavaScript. We chose to use the `requestAnimationFrame` API, an API intended to allow JavaScript code to drive fluid animations. When a developer passes a callback to this function, the browser invokes the callback right before painting the next frame for the page. Browsers aim to invoke the callback about sixty times per second (the same as the page’s overall frame rate) but will fall behind if paint performance for the page drops [38]. The attacker can take advantage of this by taking two measurements, each over a fixed time window. First, the attacker takes a control measurement `c` for oscillating between two different known-unvisited dummy URLs (e.g., `https://dummy.com` and `https://dummy2.com`). The attacker gathers `c` by cyclically registering callbacks to `requestAnimationFrame` and recording the number of times the browser invokes them. Then, using the same procedure, the attacker takes the experimental measurement `e` for oscillating between the target URL `https://ashleymadison.com` and the dummy. An `e` sig-
nificantly lower than $c$ reflects the paint performance drop that the attacker is looking for, signifying that the victim has visited https://ashleymadison.com.

One could imagine a mitigation for this attack that simply avoids re-calculating a link element’s style based on a change in destination URL alone; however, this mitigation would be ineffective. In an alternate version of this attack, the attacker leaves the link’s destination URL constant, pointing to https://ashleymadison.com, while rapidly toggling the colors in the :visited style rules via JavaScript. If https://ashleymadison.com is visited, this technique produces the same effect as before: the link’s color values rapidly change, triggering expensive re-draw operations. If it is unvisited, the color values of the link remain set to those specified outside the :visited styles. The end result is still the same: the paint performance leaks the user’s history.

**Evaluation** We find our attack effective in up-to-date versions of Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and Internet Explorer, on Windows, macOS, and Ubuntu Linux; vendors assigned our bug reports high- and medium-priority security classifications. Running the attack on a visited URL (e.g., https://ashleymadison.com) causes 70-80% fewer requestAnimationFrame callbacks to fire when compared to an unvisited URL like dummy.com. We are able to perform the attack with a measurement window of 100ms, producing measurements on the order of 4 callback invocations versus 15. This suggests that an attacker using an intelligent search strategy could quickly test many URLs of interest. As mentioned in the attack description, the right color choices make the HTML elements used by the attack invisible to the victim against the page background, and the drop in paint performance exploited would generally only show up as a slow-down of any animations embedded in the containing page.

The most similar attack to this is Paul Stone’s 2013 visited-link attack [49]. His attack follows a more traditional timing attack structure, where the attacker (1) either changes a link’s destination once or inserts a group of link elements into the page, (2) measures the time of the next 1-4 rendered frames, and (3) checks for any delay caused by the browser re-painting the link(s) as visited [49]. Testing this attack on the same browsers and operating systems as our attacks, we find it still works in Firefox on macOS and Linux (not Windows)—a testament to the difficulty of plugging these leaks. Our attack makes this challenge yet more difficult: instead of timing the duration of a single re-paint, our attack forces many (expensive) re-paints and measures the effect on the page’s frame rate.

### 3.3 Abusing fill-coloring of SVGs

Even without CSS 3D transforms, we can still tie the visited status of a link to expensive rendering operations; here, we use SVG images and the CSS fill rule. The SVG format describes an image as a series of declarative component parts—rectangles, circles, drawing paths, gradients—that browsers rasterize (render to pixels) as needed. An SVG image embedded in a web page scales to arbitrary sizes and display resolutions automatically, without loss of quality [33]. From the containing page, a developer can use CSS to reach into an SVG image and style elements within it—most notably, change their fill-color with the fill style rule [37]. Applying such color updates to complex SVG images becomes very expensive for the rendering engine.

**Attack** An attacker embeds a complicated SVG image inside a link element and sets a series of CSS fill rules under :visited selectors, specifying different color values for the image’s components depending on the link’s visited status:

```html
<a href="https://dummy.com">
  <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
    ... embedded SVG image data (verbose XML) ...
  </svg>
</a>
```

In our attack, we construct an SVG image that is extremely expensive to render: the image consists of many (7,000+) complex path elements—color-filled polygons—arranged in multiple layers. A more clever attacker can use an SVG image that optimizes the attack bandwidth.

Next, the attacker sets up a series of CSS fill rules targeting their SVG image, followed by another series using the :visited selector on the containing link—applying one color pattern when the link’s visited status is true and another when it’s false:

```html
a svg * {fill: #ffffff;}
a svg ::nth-child(3n+1) {fill: #fffeff;}
a svg ::nth-child(3n+2) {fill: #fffeff;}
a:visited svg * {fill: #fffeff;}
a:visited svg ::nth-child(3n+1) {fill: #fffeff;}
a:visited svg ::nth-child(3n+2) {fill: #fffeff;}
```

The color values were selected so that the SVG image is invisible on a white background, and so that swapping between the two color patterns is imperceptible to the victim.

The remainder of the attack proceeds exactly as in Section 3.2: the attacker uses JavaScript to rapidly switch either the link’s destination URL or the color values of the :visited style rules, in order to force many expensive re-paint operations in the case that their chosen target
URL (e.g., https://ashleymadison.com) has been visited by the user. Simultaneously, the attacker monitors the overall rendering performance of the page (e.g., with requestAnimationFrame) and compares it with a control measurement to infer the visited status of the URL.

**Evaluation** This attack is successful against Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and Internet Explorer, and was reported to vendors together with the attack in Section 3.2. As in Section 3.2, we can make visited determinations over a measurement period of 100ms (on the order of 2 callback invocations versus 5). The signal grows more and more powerful with longer periods (9 versus 41 at 1000ms, for example). Here, too, the attacker hides elements used in the attack from their victim by picking color values which blend in with the page background.

4 **Bytecode-cache attacks on history**

Beyond the visited-link mechanism—at the root of the attacks described so far—other modern browser features also leak history data. Browser optimizations that share resources between origins (e.g., caches) may let an attacker probe these resources for traces left behind by pages of different origins. In particular, we examine Chrome’s JavaScript bytecode cache (added in 2015). This cache retains the bytecode generated by the JavaScript engine when it compiles and runs a script. If the script must be executed again later, the JavaScript engine can use the cached bytecode instead of re-compiling the script [18].

By probing the bytecode cache, an attacker can reliably determine whether a victim’s browser has previously executed a particular script file—therefore inferring details of the victim’s browsing history. In fact, the attacker can detect past script executions even after the victim restarts their browser or machine, since Chrome persists its bytecode cache to disk.

**Background** Say a developer embeds the script foo.js on their website. When a user visits the developer’s website, their browser downloads foo.js, but cannot immediately begin executing it. The browser must first parse the JavaScript code in foo.js (since scripts are distributed in source form), and then compile it to bytecode suitable for driving the JavaScript engine. This initial “boot up” phase eats up a big chunk of time thanks to JavaScript’s flexible syntax and semantics. Moreover, if the developer embeds foo.js across multiple pages of their website, the performance cost gets worse and worse. With every click and page load, the browser repeats the same work to boot up foo.js.

Chrome avoids this repeated work with its “bytecode cache” optimization, which targets repeatedly-executed scripts exceeding a predefined size threshold [18, 42]. If foo.js fits this description, then upon executing it for the third time, Chrome’s JavaScript engine will stow away the generated bytecode to an on-disk cache entry keyed by foo.js’s URL. For subsequent executions, Chrome skips the usual boot up phase and reads the bytecode from cache.

**Attack** Because Chrome shares each script’s bytecode cache entry between pages of different origins, an attacker can infer history information by measuring how long Chrome takes to boot up a given script. Imagine that the attacker wants to know whether their victim has visited https://ashleymadison.com. The attacker selects a script embedded by its homepage, e.g., https://ashleymadison.com/foo.js. The selected script should be large enough that prior visits to Ashley Madison would have caused the victim’s browser to generate a bytecode cache entry for the script. Then, the attacker invisibly embeds a script tag pointing to this URL in their own page at https://attacker.com:

```html
<script src="https://ashleymadison.com/foo.js"></script>
```

When the victim visits https://attacker.com, Chrome downloads, compiles, and executes Ashley Madison’s foo.js—unless it can find an entry for https://ashleymadison.com/foo.js in its bytecode cache, in which case it skips the compilation step. In the latter case, foo.js goes from downloaded to running in significantly less time than it would otherwise (on the order of tens of milliseconds; see Figure 2). By measuring this time difference, the attacker can infer whether the victim visited Ashley Madison.

To accomplish this reliably, the attacker must precisely measure two points in time: (1) when the browser finishes downloading the script and (2) when the script starts running; these points bookend the compilation step. The attacker must explicitly avoid measuring the time the browser spends on downloading foo.js before compilation and the time it spends executing it afterward—these numbers vary based on many factors (e.g., the victim’s network connection), and therefore introduce enough noise to obscure the relevant timing signal. To track point 1—when the script is fully downloaded—the attacker can use the Resource Timing API, which provides a timestamp for this event [39]. For point 2—when the script starts running—browsers offer no direct means of measurement. However, the attacker can approximate the script’s start time by measuring the time at which the script first sets a global variable.4

---

4This is possible because most scripts large enough to trigger bytecode caching tend to contain framework or library code that they intend.
Therefore, before carrying out the attack, the attacker must identify the name of the first global variable that foo.js sets. To this end, the attacker records a list of all variables in the JavaScript global scope, i.e., the `window` object:

```javascript
var oldGlobals = Object.keys(window);
```

Next, they inject a script tag pointing to foo.js, which instructs the browser to (1) load and execute the target script and then (2) call back into their own code, the `loadCallback` function:

```javascript
var scriptTag = document.createElement('script');
scriptTag.src = 'https://ashleymadison.com/foo.js';
scriptTag.addEventListener('load', loadCallback);
document.head.appendChild(scriptTag);
```

In the `loadCallback` function, the attacker generates a new list of global variables and compares this list with `oldGlobals` to identify the name of the first global variable that foo.js sets.

In the attack phase, the attacker defines a `setter` function that is called whenever this global variable is set by foo.js. This function simply records the current time at its first call—the approximate time the script starts running. The attacker uses this timestamp and the download timestamp to compute the script boot time, which they compare against a reference measurement to infer if the script bytecode was previously cached. As Figure 2 shows, the bytecode cache can speed up the boot time by 2.5x-10x, making it easy for the attacker to infer whether or not the victim previously visited Ashley Madison.

**Evaluation** We find this attack effective against the Windows, macOS, and Linux versions of Chrome. We reported this to Google, who marked our ticket as security-sensitive with low priority to fix. The attack takes around 100ms total to detect a bytecode cache hit or miss for a target script URL, and can be performed multiple times and in parallel to bulk-query the cache for a list of targets (e.g., to scan the Alexa Top Sites [2] and construct a profile of the victim). An attacker can learn more information about their victim with a smarter selection of target scripts—for example, testing scripts which are only loaded for logged-in members of a site. All the while, the victim remains unaware of the running attack, as it involves no visible components.

In an automated scan, we confirm the presence of a suitable target script—of 100 KB or more in size, before compression—on 372 of the top 500 sites (74%). We consider this a strict lower bound for the number of websites vulnerable to our bytecode cache attack, as we only scan for script files embedded statically by each website’s HTML source. For performance reasons, some sites dynamically inject their scripts after the initial page load [3]; though bytecode cache entries are still generated for such scripts, and the attack works on them without modification, our scanning tool does not yet detect dynamically injected scripts. Additionally, around 32 of the remaining sites detected as untargetable were either CDN domains which do not serve web pages or had certificate errors that prevented us from testing them.

Compared to cache-timing attacks on other web resource types (e.g., images), our attack is more practical since it cuts out some sources of noise (e.g., from network variability); timing the compilation of a JavaScript file produces a more stable measurement than timing image downloads. Moreover, the required file size threshold to produce a detectable time difference is much smaller, enabling the attacker to target a wide range of websites.

As with most history-sniffing cache-timing attacks, our attack is destructive: the process of querying for a bytecode cache entry forces the creation of said entry if it did not already exist. This means the attack cannot be repeated against the same script URL for the same victim.

5 Consequences and defense

We test in Chrome and Firefox on three operating systems (Windows, macOS, and Ubuntu Linux), and in Edge and Internet Explorer, which are Windows-only. Two of our attacks—the CSS Paint API attack (Section 3.1) and the bytecode cache attack (Section 4)—only affect Chrome, since they target features not yet implemented in other browsers. The other two attacks—involving CSS 3D transforms (Section 3.2) and SVG fill-coloring (Section 3.3)—use more traditional features and prove effective across all four of these browsers. Finally, for comparison, we test two separate implementations of Paul Stone’s
visited-link attack [48, 55], and find it only successful in Firefox on macOS and Linux, as previously mentioned. In addition to testing the stock versions of major browsers, we also evaluate our attacks against these browsers with additional privacy features enabled and against several privacy-oriented browsers:

► **Chrome with Site Isolation.** Site Isolation [51] confines data for each origin in a separate process but does not place any restrictions on `:visited` selectors or the bytecode cache, which remain shared across isolation boundaries. As a result this feature does not prevent our attacks.

► **ChromeZero research extension.** ChromeZero tries to thwart attackers by limiting certain JavaScript APIs [45]. Since our attacks don’t rely on these APIs, they still work, even with the extension in its highest protection mode.

► **Brave.** Brave is a security- and privacy-oriented browser. But since Brave is built atop Chromium, we find it to be vulnerable to the same attacks as Chrome. (We only test this browser on macOS.)

► **Firefox with visited links disabled.** Turning off Firefox’s `layout.css.visited` configuration flag should eliminate visited link styling altogether [5, 46]. Not so: disabling the flag fails to block either our visited-link attacks or Paul Stone’s older one; we reported this bug to Mozilla.

► **The Tor Browser.** This Firefox distribution does not keep track of user history [52] and is therefore immune to our attacks.

► **The FuzzyFox and DeterFox research browsers.** Both of these modified versions of Firefox address timing side channels by reducing the resolution of explicit and implicit timers; FuzzyFox also normalizes when browser events are scheduled [8, 29]. Our two Firefox-compatible attacks still work because they don’t rely on fine-grained timers, but FuzzyFox imposes a 10x reduction in our attacks’ exfiltration bandwidth. Stone’s visited-link attack fails in both browsers. (We only compile these two on Ubuntu.)

Appendix A summarizes our results in table form.

**Defense** To address recurring same-origin policy violations, browser vendors like Mozilla restructured their browser architecture to enforce the SOP by construction [20]. We argue that they should similarly restructure browsers to address history sniffing attacks. To this end, we propose a same-origin-style policy to cover persistent data: browsers should not solely use the URL of a resource when storing it, but should also associate the origin of the page on whose behalf the code is running. For example, any history entry should be labeled with the origin of the referring page, each bytecode cache entry should be labeled with the origin of the page embedding the corresponding script, etc. Accordingly, when fetching stored data, the browser should check the origin of the page performing the lookup—and succeed only if that origin is the same as the “referrer-origin” associated with the stored data. Our proposal is similar to “domain tagging” [13] and “same-origin caching” [22], updated for the modern web.

This defense, of course, incurs some cost. For the bytecode cache, initial loads of a script on each origin would pay a cache-miss cost—but subsequent page loads would still benefit from caching; other caches would incur similar costs. To address this, we envision an extension to cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) [26] that allows popular, public resources (e.g., jQuery) to be safely shared across origins.

Our proposed defense also partially breaks web compatibility. Specifically, CSS `:visited` selectors would only accurately represent whether links have been clicked-on from a page of the same origin. But browsers have broken compatibility for privacy before: the fix for the original `:visited` leak changed the `getComputedStyle` API to return incorrect information, for example, and broke existing stylesheets using `:visited`. Our proposed fix would not only entirely replace this previous one but also provide robust protection against future attacks—even attacks that rely on user interaction [57].

### 6 Conclusion

Protecting browsing history is crucial to user privacy. The four attacks in this paper show that modern browsers fail to systematically safeguard browsing history data from web attackers; various browser features allow attackers to leak this data, in some cases at alarming rates. These attacks are, as a group, effective against all major browsers as well as several privacy-focused designs, across all three major operating systems. We propose a systematic solution to protecting browsing history data with a same-origin-style policy. Although this would incur minor performance costs and a small change to the behavior of visited link styling, we believe that these costs are worth the benefit to user privacy.

**Acknowledgments**

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References


[31] S. Lee, H. Kim, and J. Kim. Identifying cross-origin resource status using application cache. In NDSS,


## A Summary of results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Browser</th>
<th>CSS Paint</th>
<th>CSS 3D</th>
<th>SVG</th>
<th>Bytecode Cache</th>
<th>“Pixel Perfect” [48, 55]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chrome</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrome (with Site Isolation)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChromeZero [9, 45]</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brave</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefox (no visited links)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✓ Linux, macOS / ✗ Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FuzzyFox [16, 29]</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✓ Linux, macOS / ✗ Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeterFox [8, 11]</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>✗</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>–</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We evaluate our attacks and two existing attacks against all major browsers and several research prototypes. Checkmarks (✓) indicate an attack was successful, while cross-marks (✗) indicate that an attack failed. We test our attacks across three operating systems: Windows 10 Pro Version 1709 (OS Build 16299.371) with Chrome 66.0.3359.117 (with and without ChromeZero), Firefox 60.0.1, Edge 41.16299.402.0, Internet Explorer 11.431.16299.0, and Tor Browser 7.5.6; macOS 10.10.5 with Chrome 65.0.3325.181, Firefox 60.0.1, Tor Browser 7.5.6, and Brave 0.22.727; and Ubuntu Linux 18.04 with Chromium 66.0.3359.181, Firefox 60.0.1, Tor Browser 7.5.6, FuzzyFox, and DeterFox.