Here are three
sample
examination questions and here is the actual final
examination from Winter 2000, slightly revised. These documents
are in postscript.
Here |= means logical entailment, which is a semantic notion, while |- means provability, which is a syntactic, i.e. algorithmic notion. Completeness says that if A is true, then it can be proved eventually.
Given KB and A, it may be the case that KB |= A is not true and also KB |= ~A is also not true. Completeness says nothing about this case, where neither A nor ~A is entailed by KB, that is KB leaves the truth value of A unsettled.
Definition: The proof algorithm |- is refutation-complete if whenever KB |= A then KB union { ~A} |- false eventually, in finite time.
Theorem: Resolution is refutation-complete.
This theorem says that if KB entails A, then resolution will demonstrate this fact eventually. Again, nothing is said about the case where neither A nor ~A is entailed by KB.
Definition: The entailment relation |= is semi-decidable if a complete proof algorithm exists for it, while it is decidable if a proof algorithm exists that is complete and also always terminates in finite time.
Gödel's completeness theorem: First-order logic entailment |= is
semi-decidable.
Gödel's incompleteness theorem: First-order logic entailment
|= is not decidable.
Corollary: If A is not entailed by KB then resolution applied to KB union {~A} may fail to terminate.
Definition: A control strategy for resolution is complete if its use preserves refutation-completeness, i.e. if false can be proved, it can be proved while respecting the strategy.
If a policy allows only a finite number of possible resolutions, then theorem-proving always terminates in bounded time. In this case completeness must fail because it would contradict the fact that FOL is only semi-decidable, and not decidable.
Any policy that places a fixed upper bound on the length of the clauses
that may be used in a proof only allows a finite number of resolutions,
hence is incomplete. This means that allowing axioms to be used multiple
times is not enough to preserve completeness.
Usually, the set of support consists of the clauses obtained by negating the goal, plus all descendants of these clauses. Intuitively, with this strategy, the goal "supports" each resolution, at least indirectly, so each resolution is relevant to obtaining a contradiction.
Theorem: This choice of the supporting set yields a complete strategy
if the original knowledge base is consistent.
Proof idea: In this case we'll never obtain a contradiction without
using the negated goal somehow.
Note that the set of support increases at each step of the proof because each descendant of the original set of support (i.e. the clauses making up the negated goal) is added to the set of support.
Set-of-support resolution works effectively on the dolphin example. Given this knowledge base:
To prove that there exists someone who is intelligent but can't read, we refute that "intelligent implies can read," that is we prove false from that. Starting with the negated goal ~i(z) v r(z) the proof is:Those who can read are literate: ~r(x) v l(x)
Dolphins are not literate: ~d(y) v ~l(y)
Some dolphins are intelligent: d(a)
i(a)
Notice that at each step of the proof, from top to bottom, the set of support strategy gave us only one choice about which resolution to perform next, given the heuristic of always using the clause proved most recently.~i(z) v r(z) i(a)
------------------------
r(a) ~r(x) v l(x)
--------------------------------
l(a) ~d(y) v ~l(y)
---------------------------------
~d(a) d(a)
--------------
false
(1) probabilities are a language for representing knowledge about uncertainty;
(2) probability theory provides inference rules;
(3) AI provides algorithms for deduction and learning.
There is a common distinction between "frequentist" and "subjective" semantics for probabilities. A subjective probability is one that summarizes a degree of belief, while a frequentist probability summarizes a set of actual occurrences that may occurred, or could occur in the future.
Neither probability theory nor other formalisms for reasoning under
uncertainty have really successful extensions to the first-order case,
i.e. to sentences involving quantifiers. It is interesting to conjecture
that quantifiers are in fact excessively general and abstract, and that
they are in fact not used in everyday animal or human reasoning.
An "event" is a predicate on outcomes, for example "odd" or "four or less". We have
When the number of basic mutually exclusive outcomes is infinite, then
typically the probability of each individual outcome is zero, but ranges
have non-zero probabilities. An individual outcome then has a non-zero
probability
density.
Pr(A & B)
By definition Pr(A|B) = ---------
where A and B are events.
Pr(B)
If X and Y are discrete random variables then Pr(X|Y)
is
shorthand notation for a two-dimensional table.